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Managerial Decision Making and Stockholder Wealth Maximization: A Limited 
Dependent Variables Model of the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases 
Noel Reynolds 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This research attempts to provide an explanation for the firm’s choice of using either 
a dividend or a stock repurchase for distributing cash to its stockholders. It also provides an 
examination of the impact of the firm’s disbursement decision on the stock market’s 
resulting reassessment of the value of the firm. 
Before analyzing the disbursement decision, I examine the stock market effects of 
dividends and stock repurchases using an event study methodology that corrects for the 
possible variance change effects of cash distribution announcements. I find that the measured 
wealth effects are statistically significant and similar, for the most part, to that reported in 
earlier studies, notwithstanding increases in the variance of the abnormal returns distribution. 
I apply LIMDEP’s full information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) to investigate the 
factors influencing a firm’s disbursement decision. I use proxies to represent the major 
theories put forward in the literature to explain firms’ rationales for making cash 
disbursements, namely, signaling / asymmetric information, undervaluation hypothesis, 
agency theory, dividend clientele, corporate control, optimal capital structure theory, 
managerial incentives hypothesis, financial flexibility and cash flow permanence. 
 I find that the firm’s payout choice is related to the change in annual earnings per 
share, the residual volatility in daily stock returns prior to the distribution, the level of 
 v 
undervaluation, the free cash flows of the firm, the size of the firm, the extent of available 
managerial stock options, the average dividend yield, the volatility of operating earnings, 
the average daily stock return prior to announcement, the relative proportion of 
permanent cash flows, and the difference in the levels of permanent cash flows pre and 
post announcement. 
I evaluate the stock market impact of the disbursement choice by using a self-
selectivity limited-dependent variables model. The findings indicate that while open market 
repurchasing firms make optimal disbursement choices, that is reflected in the reaction of the 
stock market to the disbursement announcement, firms using repurchase tender offers make 
disbursement decisions detrimental to the welfare of their stockholders. However, similar 
results were inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends as their cash 
payout mechanism. 
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Why Study Corporate Cash Distributions to Shareholders? 
 
 Corporations in the United States utilize various mechanisms to distribute cash to 
their stockholders. Firms currently use five principal methods of corporate cash distributions: 
regular cash dividends, specially designated dividends, open-market stock repurchases, 
intrafirm repurchase tender offers, and targeted or negotiated share repurchases. These forms 
of cash payout have been the focus of numerous studies in the financial literature over the 
past years. 
 Early theoretical work on cash distributions, for the most part, did not differentiate 
between the different types of disbursements.1 For example, the agency cost motivation (to 
alleviate agency problems associated with monitoring and risk aversion of managers) of 
Easterbrook (1984), the cash flow signaling argument (to inform the market of an increase in 
the firm's earnings) of Miller and Rock (1985), and the free cash flow theory (to reduce 
agency costs associated with excess free cash flow) of Jensen (1986) apply equally to both 
dividends and stock repurchases. 
 More recent models have considered the choice between different payout methods 
and have suggested possible explanations for the form of cash distribution chosen by firms. 
Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Persons (1995) suggest signaling models where the level of 
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asymmetric information (extent of undervaluation) determines the payout choice. Barclay 
and Smith (1988) propose an alternative asymmetric information model that concentrates on 
cost-minimization as the determining factor in the firm’s choice of the form of the payouts to 
shareholders. Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989), Denis (1990), and Bagwell (1992) 
identify takeover defense as an alternative motivation for repurchases. Hausch and Seward 
(1993) model the choice as one between a deterministic (dividends) and a stochastic (share 
repurchases) disbursement and conclude that it depends on the form of the firm’s production 
function (analogous to absolute risk aversion for a utility function). Jagannathan, Stephens, 
and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) hypothesize that the financial flexibility 
inherent in stock repurchases contributes to the choice of payout method used by firms and 
indicate that the permanence of the firm’s cash flows are important in this regard, while Fenn 
and Liang (2000) examine the extent to which management stock options influence the 
choice. 
 One question that immediately arises from examining the above motivations is 
whether dividends and repurchases can be considered as true alternative forms of cash 
disbursements. In this regard it is observed that the different forms of repurchases have 
peculiar characteristics, as do the varying forms of dividend disbursements. 
 Open market repurchase programs involve firms merely announcing their intention 
to buy back shares over an extended period of time at the prevailing market price. It involves 
an ongoing “commitment” by the firm to make cash disbursements to its stockholders (albeit 
not all stockholders). A repurchase tender offer, on the other hand, constitutes a one-time 
offer by the firm to buy back stock within a specified time frame at a pre-determined price 
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(or price range in the case of dutch auctions) that is usually different from the current market 
price. Clearly, these two methods are distinct from the perspective of time frame, expectation 
of recurrence, and concomitant cost. 
 An increase in the cash dividend generally involves a commitment by the firm to 
maintain an increased payout over the foreseeable future2. Specially designated dividends, 
instead, are usually perceived as irregular and non-routine payouts (Barclay and Smith 
(1988) and Chhachhi and Davidson (1997))3. Based on these observations, the natural 
comparisons seem to be open market repurchases with dividend increases (frequent, periodic 
payout) and repurchase tender offers with specially designated dividends (infrequent, 
irregular, non-routine payout). The appropriateness of these comparisons is supported by 
recent empirical and theoretical work (for example, see Persons (1995), Stephens and 
Weisbach (1996), Chhachhi and Davidson (1997), Fenn and Liang (2000), and Guay and 
Harford (2000))4. 
 Corporate disbursements also have a significant impact on the stock markets and, 
hence, stockholders’ wealth. Existing empirical studies have revealed significant stock price 
reactions to announcements of unexpected corporate cash distributions (that is, dividends 
and stock repurchases) [ for example, Brickley (1983); Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986); Smith (1987); Healy and Palepu (1988); Bajaj and Vijh (1990); and Stephenson 
(1994)]. On average, the market’s reaction to stock repurchase announcements has been 
significantly higher than the reaction to dividend announcements. The average cumulative 
(3-day) abnormal return on stock repurchase announcements has been documented to be 
between 5 percent and 9 percent. The corresponding excess returns for unexpected dividend 
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announcements (that is, initiations, increases, and specially designated dividends) have been 
observed to be between 2 percent and 3 percent.5  
 Notwithstanding the higher observed wealth effect associated with stock repurchase 
announcements, empirical evidence shows an unexplained preference by firms for using 
cash dividends (at least up to the mid 1980s).6 For example, during the period 1983 to 1986, 
81 percent of all firms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) used cash dividends while 
only 14 percent of the firms made stock repurchases.7 During this period, these cash 
distributions averaged $94 billion per year -- representing approximately 6 percent of the 
market value of the total equity base of all the listed firms. Ofer and Thakor (1987), 
pertaining to the period prior to the mid 1980s, conclude that while the majority of US firms 
pay dividends, only a relatively small percentage utilizes stock repurchases. 
 Interestingly, in the subsequent period (post 1980s) there has been a marked decline 
in the incidence of firms utilizing dividends. Concurrently, the usage of stock repurchases 
has increased dramatically. Fama and French (2000) reveal that between 1978 and 1999 the 
proportion of firms paying cash dividends fell from 66.5 percent to20.8 percent. 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) report quite the reverse for stock repurchases. 
They indicate that between 1985 and 1996, the number of open market stock repurchase 
programs announced by U.S. industrial firms increased from 115 to 755 (a 557 percent 
increase) while the value of these transactions increased from $15.4 billion to $113 billion (a 
634 percent increase). However, they observe that while the incidence of dividend payments 
has decreased the value of these distributions continue to rise over the same period, moving 
from $67.6 billion to $141 billion (a 109 percent increase). Overall, repurchases have not 
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replaced dividends as the primary cash disbursement mechanism as dividends continue to be 
significantly higher in value than repurchases (more than double the total value of actual 
share repurchases). 
 Fama and French (2000), among others, surmise that since dividends are usually 
taxed at a higher rate than capital gains (realized though a stock repurchase), the common 
presumption is that dividends are less valuable than capital gains. Empirical evidence tends 
to support this assertion as the stock price reaction and, hence, wealth impact of a stock 
repurchase announcement on average exceeds the wealth impact associated with a dividend 
decision (see endnote 4). Given the empirical evidence suggesting that higher wealth gains to 
shareholders would result from the use of repurchases instead of dividends, the fact that 
firms continue to increase the size of dividends annually and not increase repurchases at an 
even faster rate indicate that dividends remain an enigma. The present research attempts to 
provide some answers in this regard. The problem at hand, then, is to provide insights as to 
why some firms choose to pay cash dividends while others choose to repurchase their stock, 
and, consequently, whether the choice made is in the best interest of the firm’s stockholders 
(that is, is it a wealth maximizing decision?). My results indicate that while open market 
repurchasing firms generally are making their payout decisions in order to maximize the 
returns to their stockholders (through the resulting expected stock market price reaction to 
the disbursement announcement), firms using repurchase tender offers make disbursement 
decisions detrimental to the welfare of their stockholders. However, similar results were 
inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends as their form of cash 
distribution. 
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 Theoretical and empirical financial research related to corporate cash distributions 
has focused predominantly on addressing two major issues: (i) what are the determinants of 
the observed level and frequency of corporate cash distributions? and (ii) what explanations 
can be put forward for the various forms of cash distributions observed in the market? A 
third question, arising from the above discussion, remains unaddressed: since stock 
repurchases create a greater value change in stockholders wealth, are managers maximizing 
stockholders’ wealth when they use other forms of cash distributions? Interest then centers 
on examining the expected impact on stockholders wealth of management’s choice of an 
alternative distribution method. That is, for firms that used cash dividends (stock 
repurchases) as their method of cash distribution, what would have been the stock price 
reaction had they instead decided to repurchase their stock (pay dividends)? 
 This empirical question, however, cannot be answered by merely assuming that the 
average wealth effect associated with repurchases would in fact result for a dividend 
increasing firm that decided to switch distribution methods. It in fact introduces an 
econometric problem of self-selection. If the choice to belong to one group or another is a 
function of the expected benefits of belonging to the group, then the data exhibits a 
selectivity bias and valid conclusions can only be drawn by incorporating the choice process 
explicitly in the empirical model specification. This has previously been ignored in the 
literature and is addressed in my estimation procedures. 
 The focus of this study, then, is to fill the gap in the existing literature by empirically 
examining the stockholder wealth maximization impact of management’s disbursement 
choices, thereby supplementing and extending current research in this area. In this research, I 
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examine the determinants of the choice between dividends and stock repurchases and the 
impact of that choice on the stockholders’ wealth position. The expectation is that even in 
the presence of asymmetric information, agency costs, and differing expected stock price 
reactions to the various mechanisms of cash disbursements, firms, on average, choose the 
cash distribution method that maximizes the expected gain associated with the distribution. 
Hence, managers, on average, make stockholder wealth maximizing disbursement choices 
(that is, the disbursement choice is made with reference to the expected excess returns 
generated on announcement of the decision). My results find support for this proposition 
only with regard to firms utilizing open market stock repurchases, notwithstanding the 
influence of other factors on the decision. 
 A caveat is in order: while I draw on a broad cross-section of theoretical 
underpinnings (for example, asymmetric information/signaling, agency costs, free cash flow, 
cash flow permanence, and financial flexibility) in developing my empirical model, the tests 
utilized in addressing my primary hypothesis are not designed to differentiate between the 
effects of these various theories. Further, it is not my intent to test all the possible proxies for 
the variables identified and utilized in the model. I am primarily concerned with the 
relationship between the firm’s cash disbursement choice (dividend versus stock repurchase) 
and the impact of that choice on share prices. Therefore, I employ variables from two strands 
of the cash disbursement literature (not necessarily independent) that have been used in 
previous studies to explain the disbursement choice and the magnitude of the associated 
wealth effects. 
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1.2 Specific Purpose of This Research 
 
 In a perfect capital market, the manager's choice of a disbursement method would 
be irrelevant. Under such conditions, there would exist no market frictions, investors 
would have perfect information, and, hence, the form of the distribution chosen by 
management would have no impact on the value of the firm. In this situation, dividends 
would be equivalent to stock repurchases.8 
 Given, however, that market imperfections do exist, the impact of a firm’s choice 
of distribution method is non-trivial. In fact, the choice facing managers is one that has 
implications for the value of their firm. For example, Fama and French (2000) indicate 
that due to tax implications, firms that pay dividends are at a competitive disadvantage 
since they have a higher cost of equity than firms that use stock repurchases. In addition, 
Persons (1995) points out that while the administrative expenses associated with paying a 
dividend are inconsequential, repurchases usually involve substantial transactions costs. 
Hence, with taxes, transactions costs, and asymmetric information, the firm’s choice of a 
payout method is an important decision with resultant valuation implications. 
With the plethora of theoretical and empirical financial research relating firm 
characteristics to the valuation impact (excess stock market returns) of cash distribution 
announcements (for example, Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), 
John and Williams (1985), Jensen (1986), Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1994), Chhachhi and Davidson (1997), Guay and Harford (2000), among others), it 
would seem an easy task to assess the opportunity cost of a particular disbursement 
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choice (that is, the difference between the expected wealth impact of the method used and 
that of an alternative method). However, if indeed firms make the disbursement choice on 
the basis of value maximization, the issue is much more complicated because the 
disbursement choice would then be endogenized; that is, the wealth effect associated with 
a particular choice of cash distribution would be directly related to the choice model 
itself. This introduces the econometric issue of self-selectivity bias (or simply self-
selection) mentioned earlier. In this case, correct specification of the expected wealth 
impact of an alternative cash payout method would require joint modeling of the 
disbursement choice equation and the wealth effects models for both alternative payout 
methods. This issue has not previously been addressed in the finance literature and serves 
as the major contribution of the present research. Results indicate that a selectivity bias 
should be accounted for as self-selection is a characteristic of the cash distribution 
sample. 
 This study focuses, therefore, on the firm’s choice of cash payout method and the 
impact of this choice on the firm’s stock price. The underlying premise is that the 
disbursement decision is taken to maximize the net benefit (or minimize the net cost) to 
stockholders where this benefit is measured by the excess stock market returns generated 
on announcement of the disbursement decision. I empirically model the manager’s choice 
problem -- determining whether to disburse cash as a dividend or a stock repurchase – 
and the related benefit arising from the choice (the stock market excess returns associated 
with the particular payout method chosen) by application of a limited dependent variable 
methodology, specifically a self-selectivity model, to account for the endogeneity of the 
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disbursement choice. The approach involves defining the structural model derived from 
the theoretical arguments above – that is, the three equations model describing (i) the 
firm’s choice of a payout method, and (ii) the benefits (excess stock market returns) 
model for each alternative payout method. The structural probit equations are then 
transformed to a reduced form model (by specifically accounting for the relationships 
between the equations) and solved by a full information maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure. The discriminatory variables that I use in the model are defined and explained 
in the methodology section of Chapter 3 of this study. As discussed earlier, I employ 
variables that have been used in previous studies related to cash distribution policy. They 
are based on corporate financial theory in the areas of asymmetric information 
(signaling), agency cost, free cash flow, financial flexibility, corporate control, and 
optimal capital structure. 
 Employing a self-selectivity model recognizes and adjusts for the selection bias that 
may be inherent in earlier studies that ignore the fact that firms may be “non-randomly” 
included in their sample. If indeed firms choose a particular disbursement method only when 
it is optimal (that is, in the best interests of the firm’s stockholders), then they are said to 
have self-selected within the sample.  
The self-selection arises because the choice of a cash distribution method and the 
resulting economic variable being analyzed (the excess returns around the announcement of 
the disbursement) are jointly determined by a common set of factors. As a result the error 
terms in the functional relationships explaining the disbursement choice and the excess stock 
returns would be correlated and have non-zero expectations. Where self-selection exists and 
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is not corrected, this non-random sample selection process potentially leads to biased 
inferences from the study undertaken, since the regression models estimated using ordinary 
least squares could result in inefficient and inconsistent estimates. 
 
1.3 Important Contributions of This Research 
 
 The primary contribution of this study is the use of a self-selectivity model to 
identify whether firms are making disbursement decisions that maximize their stockholders’ 
wealth. This study is the first attempt, to my knowledge, to address this issue. The research 
results suggest that the major factors affecting the firm’s choice of using either a dividend or 
a stock repurchase to make cash distributions are stockholder wealth maximization and 
issues of asymmetric information, signaling, undervaluation, agency, financing cost, 
managerial incentives, clientele, financial flexibility, and cash flow permanence. 
 By operating in an integrated framework, that is, by jointly examining the stock 
market’s reactions to dividend and repurchase announcements, the research is able to 
account for any potential self-selectivity bias that may have been overlooked in previous 
research. The primary methodology used in examining the information effects of the 
dividend and stock repurchase announcements is an event study. The research finds that self-
selection bias is a critical factor (primarily with regard to stock repurchasing firms) in 
studying the motivations for firms’ disbursement choices. Firms do not appear to randomly 
choose between the various disbursement methods. Rather, the observed choice is the result 
 12 
of a deliberate decision made by the firm (generally in the interest of maximizing the wealth 
position of its stockholders). 
 The remainder of this research paper is organized as follows. I provide in Chapter 2 a 
more detailed treatment of the theories related to corporate cash disbursements. I define in 
Chapter 3 the factors used in my model and discuss the methodology applied in the research, 
as well as indicate my data sources and outline the hypotheses that are examined. Chapter 4 
then provides the results of the study and presents an interpretation of these results in the 
present research context. A summary of the research concludes the study in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Related Literature 
 
 In this chapter I provide a detailed examination of the current literature in finance, 
both theoretical and empirical, as related to both the differing motivations posited as 
explanations of the varying forms of cash disbursements considered and the factors 
impacting the choice between disbursement methods. 
 In order to provide a more structured survey and to facilitate application to the 
present research, this survey of the literature is presented with reference to disbursement 
type. The first and second sub-sections review empirical and theoretical research related to 
dividend disbursements and stock repurchases respectively. In examining the literature 
related to dividend disbursements, I also separately consider the theoretical motivations 
posited for dividend increases and specially designated dividends. In the third sub-section I 
summarize existing research that considers the choice between different payout methods. 
 Additionally, since the decision to begin paying dividends involves other 
confounding factors, for the purpose of this study dividend disbursements focus only on 
dividend increases and special dividends. Dividend initiations are not considered. 
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2.1 Dividend Theories 
 
2.1.1  Theoretical Motivations for Dividend Increases 
 
 Three main theoretical arguments are presented in the literature to explain why 
managers make distributions in the form of dividend payments. These are (i) the cash flow 
signaling hypothesis, (ii) resolution of agency conflicts, and (iii) the taxation clientele 
hypothesis. 
 
2.1.1.1 Cash Flow Signaling. Modigliani and Miller (1964) provide the foundation for the 
signaling argument, as related to managers’ decisions to increase dividends, by positing that 
managers will increase the firm’s dividend payout only when they believe the firm can 
sustain the increased payments over the foreseeable future. This is so because they are 
reluctant to cut dividends, as the market penalizes the firm severely for so doing (empirical 
studies, e.g. Lintner (1956), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Kwan (1981) support the 
observation that the stock market reacts more negatively to an unexpected dividend cut than 
it does positively to an unexpected dividend increase of the same proportion). 
 The cash flow signaling arguments are based on the work of Bhattacharya (1979) 
and Miller and Rock (1985) and posit that, in markets with asymmetric information, 
managers of firms with high earnings prospects signal this information to the market by 
paying cash dividends. The signal becomes credible because less profitable firms are not 
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able to mimic the signal and adopt such a policy, due to the high opportunity cost of 
foregone investments. 
 The major signaling costs in Bhattacharya (1979), that lead dividends to function as a 
signal of expected cash flows, arise from the assumption made that dividends are taxed at a 
higher rate than capital gains. He develops a tax-based signaling cost model in an 
intertemporal setting, enabling the identification of the relative weights placed on the 
benefits (derives from the rise in liquidation value caused by a committed, and actually paid, 
dividend level) and costs (tax-cost ensuing because cash payouts in the form of dividends are 
assumed to be taxed at a higher personal tax rate than capital gains) of signaling with 
dividends. Under these conditions, it is shown that dividends function as a signal of expected 
future cash flows. One other interesting result of the model is that the shorter the horizons 
over which shareholders have to realize their wealth, the higher is the equilibrium proportion 
of dividends to expected earnings. 
 Miller and Rock (1985) evaluate announcement effects and their consequences under 
conditions of asymmetric information (where the firm’s managers are assumed to know 
more than outside investors about the true state of the firm’s current earnings) using a two-
period, one decision, no-tax, uncertainty model of the firm’s combined dividend, investment, 
and financing decision. Their model is based on the familiar cash flow identity, namely, that 
the sources of funds to the firm (earnings plus financing) must be equal to its uses of funds 
(dividends plus investment). Given that the investment and financing decisions are known 
(or fixed), they show that in a world of rational expectations, the firm’s dividend 
announcements provide just enough pieces of the firm’s sources and uses statement for the 
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market to deduce the unobserved piece, that is, the firm’s current earnings. The dividend 
announcement conveys information indirectly, and need not represent any deliberate attempt 
by the managers of the firm to reveal their private information. The dividend announcement 
merely provides the market with the missing piece of the cash flow identity that allows the 
market to estimate the firm’s current earnings. It is then the earnings estimate, rather than the 
dividend itself, that the market utilizes to estimate the expected future earnings, and thereby 
the firm’s market value. Dividends can, therefore, by this indirect route, acquire an important 
informational signal content. 
 John and Williams (1985) also present a similar model to Miller and Rock (1985), in 
the framework of a signaling equilibrium, where they show that firms with more favorable 
inside information optimally pay higher dividends and receive appropriately higher prices 
for their stock. In their model, taxes are paid only on dividends, no transaction costs are 
incurred when issuing, retiring, or trading shares, and all sources and uses of the firms’ funds 
are fully observed by outsiders through costless public audits. They show that under these 
circumstances, corporate insiders distribute taxable dividends, which the market interprets as 
a dissipative signal, if and only if the demand for cash by both the firm and its current 
stockholders exceeds the supply of internal funds. The intuition behind their signaling 
equilibrium lies in the fact that current stockholders will suffer some dilution in their 
fractional ownership of the firm when the firm needs to raise investment funds (by selling 
new shares or retiring fewer outstanding shares), or the current stockholders need to raise 
cash on personal account (by selling existing shares). Reducing this dilution will be more 
valuable to current stockholders when their private information is more favorable. Hence, 
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insiders, acting in their stockholders best interests, may distribute a taxable dividend if 
outside investors recognize this relationship, bid up the stock price, and thereby reduce 
current stockholders’ dilution. 
 A number of empirical papers have appeared in the literature providing support for 
the cash flow signaling argument. Ofer and Siegel (1987) document significant analyst 
forecast revisions following dividend changes and indicate that this evidence lends support 
to the information signaling hypothesis. 
 Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), integrate the cash flow signaling, free-cash flow / 
agency cost, and clientele hypotheses in a single testing framework and find support for the 
cash flow signaling argument. They use a standard event study methodology with market 
model coefficients to calculate the two day excess returns around the dividend change 
announcement. The data sample consisted of 6,777 dividend change announcements of at 
least 10 percent (5,992 dividend increases and 785 dividend decreases) made by 
NYSE/AMEX firms over the period 1962-1988. Their sample exhibited a significant two-
day announcement period excess returns of 1.25 percent for dividend increases and –5.71 
percent for dividend decreases. Using a cross-sectional multiple regression model to 
simultaneously control for the standardized dividend change, dividend yield, and Tobin’s Q, 
they find that announcement period excess returns are positively related to the magnitude of 
the standardized dividend change and to the dividend yield, but unrelated to Tobin’s Q. They 
provide further evidence on the signaling argument by showing that analysts significantly 
revise their earnings forecasts (using a moving average technique to estimate the unexpected 
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revision in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts) following dividend changes9 and that Q<1 
firms actually increase their capital expenditures following dividend increases. 
 An alternative signaling hypothesis presented by Grullon, Michaely, and 
Swaminathan (1999) is that dividend increases signal a firm’s long-term transition from 
growth phase to a more mature phase (with a resultant decrease in systematic risk). Using a 
sample of 7,642 dividend changes announced between 1968 and 1993 they find that firms 
that increase dividends experience a significant decline in their systematic risk (as measured 
by changes in the factor loadings from the Fama-French (1993) three factor model) and that 
the positive market reaction to the announced dividend increase is related to the decline in 
systematic risk. 
 
2.1.1.2 Resolving Agency Conflicts: The general arguments presented in these theories are 
that by increasing dividend payments firms help to mitigate agency problems existing 
between managers and shareholders. The specific mechanism by which this is accomplished 
differs, however, among the various models. 
 Rozeff (1982) presents an ownership structure hypothesis suggesting that the 
characteristics of a firm's stockholdings significantly impact its optimal financial policies, 
implying that firms which initiate dividend payments should either have lower insider 
shareholdings or have experienced a larger reduction in insider shareholdings since their 
initial offering, than comparable non-dividend paying firms. Newly public firms maintaining 
a cohesive ownership structure -- with high levels of insider and/or institutional 
shareholdings – are assumed to generate few agency costs by nature, as ownership and 
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control are tightly integrated (hence, agency problems are deemed to arise as a direct result 
of the separation of ownership and control). These firms are thus unlikely to initiate or 
increase dividend payments (for the purpose of resolving agency conflicts). The reverse also 
holds true -- the lack of a compact structure induces agency costs due to the separation of 
ownership and control of the firm, and dividends are used by the firm to alleviate these costs. 
 Easterbrook (1984) hypothesizes that dividends serve as a means of inducing 
managers to more frequently raise funds from the public capital market -- where monitoring 
and control activities can be more effectively enacted -- thus alleviating agency problems 
associated with monitoring costs and risk aversion on the part of managers. This is so 
because dividends dissipate the firm’s supply of internally generated funds (cash) and induce 
firms to float new securities to generate funds for investment projects. His capital market 
monitoring theory implies that firms that use dividend payments to alleviate serious agency 
problems, as related to the above, should subsequently issue debt and/or equity securities 
more frequently than comparable non-dividend firms. 
 Jensen (1986) posits that a firm with free cash flow, that is, cash flow in excess of 
that necessary to fund all available positive net present value projects, should experience a 
positive stock market reaction to an increase in its dividend payment. His argument is 
founded on the premise that payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ 
control, thereby reducing managers’ power, and making it more likely they will incur the 
monitoring of the capital markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital 
(similar to the argument of Easterbrook (1984) above). Free cash flow in the hands of 
managers generates agency costs as managers have incentives to expend funds on perquisites 
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or sub-optimal investments and acquisitions, rather than making payments to shareholders. 
Their willingness to relinquish control of free cash flow -- by distributing dividends – 
therefore indicates their commitment to acting in shareholders best interests, hence a 
reduction in agency costs and an increase in shareholder wealth. 
 The empirical findings tend to lend some measure of support for the agency cost 
resolution theories. In their study, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) document the existence of a 
strong relationship between the generation of excess free cash flow and the decision by firms 
to begin paying dividends. They suggest that unexpected dividend change announcements by 
“overinvestor” firms (that is, those firms that invest in negative net present value (NPV) 
projects) convey information regarding the firms’ future investment levels. A dividend 
increase suggests that the firm will invest less in the future than was expected. This will be 
interpreted favorably by the market since the firm was expected to have invested in negative 
NPV projects otherwise. Using Tobin’s Q as an indicator of the profitability of new 
investment opportunities they find that firms with Q<1 have greater price reactions, on 
average, to dividend changes than do Q>1 firms. 
 Additionally, in the agency theory realm, Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) 
hypothesize that managers may use dividend increases as a mechanism to redistribute wealth 
from bondholders to stockholders. This “wealth redistribution” hypothesis states that 
unexpected dividend increases would transfer wealth from the bondholders to the 
equityholders if the dividends are financed by issuing new debt at equal or higher seniority 
than outstanding debt, or by reducing investment outlays. The wealth redistribution results 
from the increase in the risk of the firm’s currently outstanding bonds that accompany the 
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two aforementioned mechanisms (debt-financed or investment-financed dividends). The 
implication of this is that the positive (negative) impact of dividend announcements on stock 
prices should be accompanied by negative (positive) effects on the bond prices. 
 They tested their hypothesis by examining 255 bonds chosen randomly from NYSE 
firms announcing dividend payments during 1975 to 1976 (the 255 sample firms made 1,967 
dividend announcements over the period). They used the mean-adjusted returns model of 
Brown and Warner (1980) to estimate the bond price effects (excess returns) for the day 0 
and 30-day (–15 to +15) announcement period windows. Their results indicated that bond 
prices are not affected by dividend increases but react negatively to dividend reductions. 
This finding thus contradicted their wealth redistribution hypothesis and instead supported 
the information signaling hypothesis for dividend announcements. 
 
2.1.1.3 Taxation Clienteles. The body of literature in this section is based on the hypothesis 
that high income tax bracket investors will tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks, with the 
reverse also holding true. Elton and Gruber (1970) provide support for this argument by 
documenting a positive correlation between the dividend yield of securities and the 
proportionate size of their relative ex-dividend price drop. They also show that the ex-
dividend price drop is smaller than the dividend per share, which infers a tax effect. 
 Bajaj and Vijh (1990) suggest dividend clienteles as a partial explanation of the 
observed stock price reaction to dividend change announcements. They theorize that the 
price reaction is influenced by the yield preferences of the marginal investor in the firm’s 
shares. Hence, the market reaction to the announcement will be related to the firm’s dividend 
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yield, that is, dividend-yield surprises will be perfectly correlated with dividend surprises. 
They examine 1,188 dividend decreases and 7,322 dividend increases between 1962 and 
1987 for firms listed on the 1987 CRSP daily master file (NYSE and AMEX stocks), and use 
the market model to measure the cumulative abnormal returns for the 3-day period (-1 to +1) 
around the dividend announcement, splitting the sample into three sub-groups of high, 
medium, and low dividend yield firms. Using the firm’s preannouncement yield as a proxy 
for the market’s anticipated yield, they find that the magnitude of the stock price reaction to 
the dividend change announcement is greater the higher the anticipated yield (their average 
3-day CAR around dividend increase announcements was statistically significant at 1.04 
percent for the entire sample). Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) provide similar 
evidence by examining the relationships between firms’ stock prices and their respective 
dividend yields.10 
 Kalay (1982) attempts to refute these arguments by showing that marginal tax rates 
cannot be inferred from the existing data without additional information. However, after 
adjusting for the dual potential biases in the earlier research, his results remain "consistent" 
with a tax effect. Barclay (1987) provides strong rebuttal for the taxation clientele 
hypothesis, providing documentary evidence that taxes are not a primary factor in the 
dividend decision -- since dividends were in fact being paid before they were subject to 
taxation and continued to be popular thereafter. 
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2.1.2 Theoretical Motivations for Specially Designated Dividends 
 
 Two major arguments are presented with respect to theoretical justification for 
specially designated dividends (SDDs). As suggested from the earlier discussion in chapter 
1, these are similar to the explanations for regular dividends, namely cash flow signaling and 
agency cost resolution (specifically free cash flow hypothesis). 
 
2.1.2.1 Cash Flow Signaling. Theory would suggest that the labeling of dividends as 
"special", "extra", or "year-end" conveys information to the market about future earnings and 
dividends. Financial texts suggest that special dividends convey information that is of a 
"temporary" or "transitory", rather than permanent, nature -- indicating a lower probability 
(as compared to regular dividend increases) of the "increase" being sustained. Brickley 
(1983) reveals that SDDs provide positive but "weaker" information than regular dividends. 
He concludes that SDDs provide information of more than a transitory or temporary nature -- 
information that is not obviously differentiated from that provided by regular dividend 
increases. Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) show that the level of information conveyed by 
SDDs is negatively related to the frequency of the dividend. They find no evidence of 
bondholder wealth expropriation -- the gains accrue solely to shareholders. Howe, He, and 
Kao (1992) also provide indirect support for the signaling hypothesis. They find no 
significant difference in stock price reactions to SDDs for high Tobin's-Q (value-
maximizers) versus low Tobin's-Q (overinvestors) firms. 
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2.1.2.2 Resolving Agency Conflicts (Free Cash Flow Theory). This is essentially the 
Jensen argument presented in the other dividend sections -- this theory cannot discriminate 
among the different forms of dividend payments cited. Further support for this explanation is 
provided by Kanatas and Ofer (1992) who develop a model showing that a one-time 
payment (SDDs) does not provide sufficient information necessary to induce appropriate 
managerial effort, thereby minimizing agency problems.  
 
2.2  Stock Repurchases Theories - Open Market and Tender Offers 
 
2.2.1 Information Signaling Hypothesis 
 
 The signaling hypothesis theorizes that a firm's management will repurchase its 
shares if it is believed the stock represents a good investment, that is, signaling to the market 
that the shares are undervalued and/or that the firm's prospects -- cash flow, earnings, and 
risk -- are positive. The cost to signal such information is, however, not the same for all 
firms. In fact, firms without such positive information will have a much higher signaling 
cost, and this prevents such firms from sending false signals. To be a valid signal, 
management must commit not to sell its own shares back to the firm during the repurchase 
program.11 The signal becomes credible because the managers would then be acting against 
their own best interests to falsely signal positive information while at the same time retain 
their own shares in the firm. 
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 Vermaelen (1981) examined this proposal by observing the pricing behavior of 
securities of firms repurchasing their own shares. His results provide support for the 
signaling hypothesis and he concludes:  
"...firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive 
information...the market uses the premium, the target fraction, and the fraction of 
insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement 
date." 
 Additional support for signaling, as applied to stock repurchase announcements, has 
been provided by Klein and Rosenfeld (1988), Hertzel and Jain (1991), Bartov (1991), and 
Tsetsekos (1993), among others. 
 
2.2.2 Leverage / Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis 
 
 The theory developed here has its foundation in theoretical models developed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) reflecting the valuation 
effects of capital structure changes. The hypothesis states that a corporation's managers 
provide information that the firm is moving closer to its optimal capital structure -- replacing 
equity with tax-deductible debt -- by repurchasing the company's shares. 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) model agency costs for the firm characterized by a 
separation of ownership and control, and show that these costs (monitoring and bonding 
expenditures and the residual loss from investment decisions of managers) are reduced by 
the existence of risky debt in the firm’s capital structure. Monitoring provided by 
debtholders results in the firm’s total monitoring costs being less when both debt and equity 
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financing comprise the firm’s capital structure, than for the firm being fully equity financed. 
Thus, some proportion of debt financing will be necessary to minimize total agency costs 
and thereby maximize firm value. Hence, a firm with a lower proportion of debt than the 
level required to minimize total agency costs will benefit from an increase in leverage. 
 DeAngelo and Masulis provide evidence that builds on the earlier work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) that an increase in corporate debt provides increased tax-
deductible interest payments, thereby increasing the firm’s debt tax shield and hence the 
value of the firm. They show that individual tax preferences against debt -- that treat equity 
income more favorably than debt income -- diminish but do not completely offset the 
corporate advantage of debt. 
 Empirical analysis of this position has been provided by Masulis (1980b), who 
considered the impact of capital structure change announcements on security prices and 
reported significant price adjustments in firms' common stock, preferred stock, and debt 
related to these announcements. His results are consistent with both the leverage hypothesis 
and the wealth expropriation hypothesis discussed below. The work of Smith (1987) also 
provides support for a leverage or tax effect. 
 
2.2.3 Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis 
 
 The argument posited here is that since repurchasing stock reduces the assets of the 
firm and increases its leverage, thus reducing the safety of outstanding debt, it thereby 
transfers wealth from the corporate debtholders to the shareholders -- an effect similar to that 
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produced by spin-offs, as documented by Galai and Masulis (1976) -- if debtholders are not 
completely protected by covenants. 
 This idea has been advanced by Masulis (1980a) and Dann (1981) but has not 
received strong empirical support. Dann finds no significant loss in wealth being suffered by 
bondholders upon a repurchase announcement, while Masulis (1980b) finds that only 
debtholders devoid of complete covenant protection against the issue of subsequent debt 
instruments -- equal or senior standing -- experience significant negative returns. 
 
2.2.4 Agency Cost & Free Cash Flow Theory 
 
 Again, this is Jensen's argument that distributing excess free cash flow -- in this case 
a current accumulation that is not necessarily expected to continue in the future -- signals to 
the market management's acting in the best interests of shareholders by relinquishing control 
of such free cash flow, thereby reducing agency costs. Jensen's theory is unable to 
discriminate among the various forms of corporate cash disbursement policies and is equally 
applicable to dividends and repurchases. Vermaelen's (1984) results provide additional 
tentative support for the hypothesis that stock prices reflect adverse managerial incentives. 
 
2.2.5 Corporate Control Hypothesis 
 
 In addition to the traditional motivations presented above, more recent research has 
focused on the use of stock repurchases as a mechanism of corporate control. Bagnoli, 
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Gordon, and Lipman (1989) present a model with stock repurchases serving as a defense 
against takeovers by signaling managers' private information about the value of the firm. 
Denis (1990) and Bagwell (1992) also identify takeover defense as an alternative motivation 
for repurchases.  
 Sinha (1991) uses repurchases as a mechanism for disciplining managers to act in 
shareholders best interests. A debt-financed repurchase, through the threat of bankruptcy and 
the subsequent loss of perquisites, ensures that managers carry out investments that increase 
firm value. The optimal mix of investment and debt-financed repurchase is determined by a 
trade-off between the benefits of a reduced probability of takeover and the cost of an 
increased probability of bankruptcy. 
 
2.3 Studies Incorporating Both Disbursement Types 
 
 There exists a paucity of financial research examining firms’ choice of disbursement 
mode in an integrated framework. Most of the work to date has focused not on developing a 
choice model but instead on postulating a cost-benefit analysis for the choice and examining 
the stock market’s reaction to one type of disbursement conditioned by the firm’s prior use 
of other types. 
 Ofer and Thakor (1987) were perhaps the first to examine the interaction of 
dividends and stock repurchases by exploring the informational roles of both simultaneously. 
They develop a joint dissipative signaling model in which managers transmit their privately 
held information through both corporate cash-distribution methods. Managers are thus able 
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to signal the true value of their firms by using either a dividend, a stock repurchase, or both. 
The central assumption of their model that creates a signaling-cost structure difference 
between dividends and repurchases is that managers are excluded from tendering in a 
repurchase -- an assumption that has been supported in the empirical literature. Additionally, 
they require a managerial incentive contract necessary to provide the manager a reason to 
signal: one such that a nontrivial component of the manager’s compensation is driven 
positively by the postsignal value of the firm. From their model, they show that both 
dividends and repurchases will generally be used as signals and neither dominates under all 
circumstances. They were also able to rationalize and explain why a stock repurchase elicits 
a significantly higher average stock market reaction than a dividend announcement. 
However, as per their own conclusion, their model “seems particularly suited to relatively 
small firms in which insiders can be expected to have sizable stock holdings.”12 
Barclay and Smith (1988) approach the choice between dividends and repurchases 
from a cost minimization perspective. To explain the empirically documented overwhelming 
use of cash dividends by firms, they argue that there exists a previously unrecognized cost 
associated with open-market repurchases that does not arise with dividend payments. Their 
information-asymmetry hypothesis posits that more trading by informed managers increases 
the bid-ask spread, reduces the liquidity of the firm’s shares, and thereby increases the firm’s 
cost of capital -- hence reducing its market value. This liquidity cost arises since the 
specialist, on observing additional informed traders entering the market, finds that he no 
longer covers the opportunity cost of his time and invested capital at the current bid-ask 
spread. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, their analysis 
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implies that repurchases do not dominate dividends as a form of making cash distributions to 
shareholders. 
 Hausch and Seward (1993) provide a more esoteric signaling model to determine a 
firm’s choice between stock repurchases and dividends. They consider the manager’s 
problem of selecting a cash distribution method as the choice between deterministic and 
stochastic disbursements. Their model is, however, a univariate signaling model and, as 
such, they are not able to explain why firms utilize different forms of stochastic distributions. 
Their study concludes that the firm’s choice of a deterministic or stochastic distribution 
depends on a property of the firm’s production function that is analogous to absolute risk 
aversion for the utility function. The high quality firm prefers to signal quality with a 
stochastic (deterministic) disbursement when there is decreasing (increasing) absolute risk 
aversion. 
 Fama and French (2000) examined the incidence of dividend payers among NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms over the period 1926-99. They reveal that while the proportion 
of firms paying cash dividends increased from 33.6 percent to more than 90 percent between 
1933 and 1962, the proportion of firms paying cash dividends fell from 66.5percent to 20.8 
percent between 1978 and 1999. They conclude that this is due partly to the changing 
characteristics of publicly traded firms, with a shift towards small firms with low 
profitability and strong growth opportunities. However, even after controlling for these 
factors they find that firms have, over the sample period, exhibited a lower propensity to pay 
dividends (that is, a declining likelihood of paying dividends). This they interpret to mean 
that the perceived benefits of dividends decline through time. 
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 Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) examine the growth in open market 
repurchases and the determinants of payout policy from a sample of repurchase programs 
announced between 1985 and 1996. They indicate that between this period the number of 
open market stock repurchase programs announced by U.S. industrial firms increased from 
115 to 755 (a 650 percent increase) while the value of these transactions increased from 
$15.4 billion to $113 billion (a 750 percent increase). However, they observe that while the 
incidence of dividend payments has decreased the value of these distributions continue to 
rise over the same period, moving from $67.6 billion to $141 billion (a 109 percent 
increase). Their primary hypothesis is that dividends represent an ongoing commitment and 
are used to distribute permanent cash flows, while repurchases are used to pay out cash flows 
that are potentially temporary. Their empirical evidence indicates that stock repurchases are 
used by firms with higher “temporary” non-operating cash flows, greater earnings volatility, 
and following poor stock market performance. On the other hand, firms tend to increase 
dividends following good performance and when they have higher “permanent” operating 
cash flows. 
 Guay and Harford (2000) arrive at similar conclusions to Jagannathan, Stephens, and 
Weisbach (2000), but use a different empirical approach. They reiterate that cash-flow 
shocks preceding a dividend increase will have a larger permanent component than that 
preceding a repurchase and that the market uses the firm’s payout choice to update its belief 
about the permanence of cash-flow shocks. 
 Fenn and Liang (2000) examine the effect of managerial stock incentives on 
corporate payout policy using a sample of 1,108 non-financial firms listed in the S&P 500, 
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S&P Midcap 400, or S&P Smallcap 600 indices. They find that managerial stock options are 
related to the composition of cash payouts. In particular, their empirical evidence shows a 
negative relationship between dividends and the level of management stock options and a 
positive relationship between repurchases and the level of management stock options. They 
conclude that the growth in managerial stock options partially explains the increase in 
repurchases relative to dividends. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
 The literature on corporate payout policy is extensive. In my survey I have 
concentrated primarily on the two strands relevant to the research question being considered. 
On the one hand, I have considered various viewpoints as to the important factors associated 
with the magnitude of the stock price announcement effects related to corporate cash 
disbursements. Our discussion indicates that among the relevant factors in this regard would 
be the size of the firm, the level of asymmetric information (incorporating earnings and 
systematic risk expectations), the prior dividend yield (representing the clientele effect), the 
level of free cash flows (potential for reduction of agency costs), and the current debt level of 
the firm (purported by the optimal capital structure hypothesis). 
 On the other hand, I have focused my attention on the factors that have been 
theorized and empirically examined as having an impact on the choice of corporate payout 
method (repurchases or dividends). Our review suggests that the level of asymmetric 
information, extent of undervaluation in the firm’s stock price, financial flexibility inherent 
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in the firm ( measured by the permanence of the firm’s cash flows, the volatility of its 
earnings, and the prior market performance of its stock), the extent of available managerial 
stock options, the level of its free cash flows (and associated agency costs), and the existence 
of hostile takeover attempts facing the firm are the factors influencing the choice. 
 As I develop my empirical model in the next chapter proxies for these variables will 
be applied in examining the research question posited and will form the basis of our 
conclusions developed in the context of the statistical testing of that model.
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
 
3.1 Specific Hypothesis Considered 
 
 The design of the present research and the methodologies applied therein take into 
account the factors discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 2. The main purpose of the research is 
to investigate whether managers’ choices between dividends and stock repurchases as 
alternative payout methods are value maximizing from the perspective of the firm’s 
stockholders.  
 The specific hypothesis that I examine may be stated as: 
 
 Ho: Managers do not discriminate in their choice of a payout method. 
 Ha: Managers discriminate between dividends and repurchases by 
maximizing the expected abnormal returns following the 
disbursement announcement. 
 
 The validity of the hypothesis is examined in two stages. First, relevant variables are 
extracted from the literature as it relates to motivations for cash disbursements and these are 
utilized in jointly estimating (using a self-selectivity modeling approach) the manager’s 
disbursement decision and the resulting stock market excess returns around the 
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announcement of the decision. In step two I examine what the expected excess returns would 
have been had the alternate choice been made by the manager and then conclude whether the 
choice was a stockholder wealth maximizing one. 
 
3.2 Methodology Development and Determination of Test Statistics 
 
 From the earlier discussions in chapter 1 of this study the decision between stock 
repurchases and dividends is looked at in two regards. These are the choices between: 
1. Dividend Increases and Open Market Stock Repurchases, and 
2. A Specially Designated Dividend and a Repurchase Tender Offer. 
 In modeling the above choices I apply a limited dependent variables estimation 
technique known as self-selectivity. Self-selectivity implies that firms are not indifferent in 
choosing to distribute cash to their stockholders in the form of dividends or stock 
repurchases. Rather, the observed choice of disbursement method is the result of a deliberate 
and specific decision made by the firm. According to Maddala (1991): 
 “The self-selection model is based on the idea that individuals choose one of two 
groups on the basis of expected benefits from belonging to the two groups. 
…Sometimes the benefits can be captured by the stock price…” 
 As such, the observed cross-sectional “informational” effect is conditional on the 
choices made. Therefore, I would not expect the same average effect to be observed for firms 
choosing to engage in either event. The process generating observed abnormal stock market 
returns is thus modeled as a “switching regression model with endogenous switching”,13 
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requiring the researcher to simultaneously estimate: (i) the unconditional cross-sectional 
announcement period cumulative abnormal return experienced for each event type, (ii) the 
decision process adopted by the firm in choosing between the different methods of 
disbursement, and (iii) the impact of the firm’s choice of disbursement type on the observed 
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns. 
 Our foundational premise is that a firm, having decided to distribute cash to its 
stockholders, will make a dividend payment only if the net gain from this option is greater 
than the gain arising from a stock repurchase. That is, dividends will be used as the cash 
disbursement choice if 
 ( ) ( ) RiDiiRiiDi CCVVVV −>−−− 00  (1) 
where VDi and VRi are the values of the firm after making the dividend payment or 
stock repurchase, respectively, V0i is the value of the firm before making the cash 
distribution, and CDi and CRi are the respective costs associated with the dividend 
payment or the stock repurchase. If we standardize all variables in terms of the value 
of the firm before the disbursement, V0i, then the firm will utilize dividends if 
 0* >−−= iRiDii cRRI  (2) 
where Ii* is the net gain from paying dividends rather than repurchasing stock, RDi is the 
return from making a dividend payment, RRi is the return from making a stock repurchase, 
and ci is the difference in cost of making a dividend payment relative to a stock 
repurchase expressed as a fraction of the value of the firm. 
 Ii*, the decision variable, is a latent unobservable variable. The firm will make a 
dividend payment where the net gain, Ii*, is greater than zero and utilize a stock repurchase 
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where it is less than zero. Although the decision variable is not observed, we do however 
observe the firm’s choice, and this is modeled by the binary selection index (dummy 
variable) defined as: 
 01 * ≥= ii IifI  (for dividends) 
 00 * <= ii IifI  (for stock repurchases) 
 Similarly, for each firm making a cash distribution, the cumulative abnormal return 
around the announcement of the disbursement choice is observed ex-post. We can thus 
specify the excess returns equations for firms making dividend payments and stock 
repurchases as follows: 
 0* ≥+= iDiDDiDi IiffXCAR µβ  (3) 
 0* <+= iRiRRiRi IiffXCAR µβ  (4) 
Equation (3) represents the cumulative abnormal return to be expected by a firm on 
announcement of a dividend disbursement while equation (4) represents a similar effect for 
the firm choosing a stock repurchase. The Xi terms represent the exogenous factors expected 
to influence the wealth effect associated with the disbursement. These are outlined and 
discussed in a later section. βD and βR are vectors of coefficients that may differ depending on 
which disbursement choice is used, while µDi and µRi are the error terms in the respective 
regression equations. We can substitute equations (3) and (4) into equation (2) to yield a 
reduced form selection index, namely: 
 ( ) ( )RiDiRDii XI µµββ −+−=  
 or 
 iii ZI µγ −=  (5) 
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 The coefficients in equation (5) are not directly observable, however, due to the self-
selectivity bias resulting from the disbursement choice being endogenously determined. That 
is, the selection bias arises because the choice of a disbursement method and the abnormal 
returns on announcement of the decision are jointly determined by a common set of 
unobservable factors. The result is that the error terms in equation (3) and (4) will be 
correlated with the error term in equation (5) and will have non-zero expectations. According 
to Shehata (1991): 
“Recent developments in econometrics suggest that, in the presence of self-selection 
bias, using OLS in the usual fashion to estimate regression models could result in 
inefficient and inconsistent estimates”. 
 Given the observations Ii, I use the probit maximum likelihood to estimate the 
parameter γ. However, γ is estimable only up to a scale factor and I thus set Var (µi)=1 
[Maddala (1991) indicates that the assumption of Var(ui)=1 is because Ii* is observed 
only as a dichotomous indicator]. Finally, I assume that µDi, µRi, and µI have a trivariate 
normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix: 
 ∑=
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 Since σDR is not estimable by maximum likelihood (by design I treat repurchases and 
dividends as separate observations and never group these for the same firm), I can set it 
equal to zero and transform the Σ matrix in (6) to obtain: 
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 The likelihood function for the model is then given by: 
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where g(.) and f(.) are the bivariate normal density functions of (µDi, µi) and (µRi, µi) 
respectively. Although maximization of the likelihood function in equation (7) is possible, it 
can be quite cumbersome. Lee (1978) outlined a simpler two-stage “structural probit” 
estimation method that involves first estimating γ from the reduced form binary choice 
equation (5) by probit maximum likelihood (ML) and then using this estimate to transform 
and solve equations (3) and (4) by ordinary least squares (OLS). The predicted benefit 
differential, (
∧∧ − RiDi CARCAR ), is then introduced in the disbursement choice equation (5) to 
obtain the “structural form” probit equation that allows for consistent estimation, again by 
applying maximum likelihood procedures. The detailed “two-stage structural probit 
estimation procedure” is as follows: 
 First, obtain the expected values of µDi and µRi conditional on the firm’s choice of 
being in the sample (another way to think of this is that we are considering the expectation of 
the abnormal returns conditional on the distribution being observed, whether a dividend or a 
repurchase), which is defined as14: 
 ( ) ( )( )iiDiiDi Z
Z
ZE γ
γφσµγµ µ ′Φ
′=≥′  (8) 
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 and 
 ( ) ( )( )( )iiRiiRi Z
Z
ZE γ
γφσµγµ µ ′Φ−
′−=<′
1
 (9) 
 In equations (8) and (9) the first term on the right-hand side of the equations 
measures the relationship (covariance) between the manager’s decision (choice of 
disbursement method) and the outcome of the decision (resulting abnormal return), which 
indicates whether managers are acting on shareholders’ behalf. It essentially is the linear 
regression coefficient that results from regressing the error terms in the decision model 
(equation (5)) against the error terms in the abnormal returns models (equations (3) and (4)). 
 The second term, referred to as the Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio (or the non-selection 
hazard), is an expectation of the value of the error term in the decision model conditional on 
the firm using either a dividend or a stock repurchase respectively (since the conditional 
distributions of these error terms are normal). The Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio is the ratio of 
the probability to the cumulative density functions evaluated at the point at which the 
distribution is “separated”. As the probability of being in the selection sample (in this case, 
distributing through dividends) increases, the cumulative density function approaches one 
and the probability density function approaches zero, so the Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio 
approaches zero. Hence, a positive (negative) coefficient on this variable in the dividend 
(repurchase) abnormal returns equation indicates that sample selection is important and that 
indeed managers are making decisions with regard to the welfare of the firm’s stockholders. 
 This result implies that the error terms in the abnormal return regression equations 
will have non-zero expectations (and, hence, the self-selectivity bias). 
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 Given these two expectations, define ( )( )i
i
Di Z
ZW γ
γφ
′Φ
′=  and ( )( )( )i
i
Ri Z
Z
W γ
γφ
′Φ−
′−=
1
, and 
then I can rewrite equations (3) and (4) as: 
 1=++′= iDiDiDDiDDi IforWXCAR εσβ µ  (3a) 
 0=++′= iRiRiRRiRRi IforWXCAR εσβ µ  (4a) 
where the new error terms, Diε  and Riε  have zero conditional means. 
 Equations (3a) and (4a) provide an insight into the self-selectivity issue. Instead of 
linear equations we have two non-linear equations after the non-zero means have been 
adjusted. Equation (3a) shows that the expected CAR for a firm that announces a dividend 
consists of two separate components. The first term, DiD Xβ ′ , is the expected stock market 
effect for a random firm that elects to announce a dividend payment. The second term, 
DiD Wµσ , is the adjustment for self-selectivity that may be inherent in the sample. The 
covariance term, µσ D , is of particular importance. It indicates that a randomly selected firm, 
were it to choose to pay a dividend, would not experience a similar stock price effect to that 
experienced by firms that actually paid dividends. Similar reasoning would apply to the 
terms in equation (4a). 
 Using our estimate of γ from the probit maximum likelihood estimation of equation 
(5) we obtain estimates for WDi and WRi in equations (3a) and (4a) respectively. We then 
proceed to solve these equations by OLS regression, which will provide consistent estimates 
for βD, βR, σDµ, and σRµ. A test for the presence of self-selectivity bias is then performed by 
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examining the statistical significance of the coefficient on the Wi terms in the revised 
abnormal returns equations (3a) and (4a). 
 Two potential problems arise with this estimation procedure, however. First, the 
residuals Diε  and Riε  in equations (3a) and (4a) are heteroscedastic. The second potential 
problem with the “two-stage structurtal probit” approach was identified by Lee, Maddala, 
and Trost (1980) who show that the true variances in equations (3a) and (4a) will be 
underestimated since the selectivity variables are themselves estimates, that is, they are 
“generated regressors”. However, the computer package used in estimating these equations 
in the present research, LIMDEP, provides a full information maximum likelihood estimator 
(FIML) that jointly estimates all the parameters in the model and corrects for these 
difficulties. This methodological approach is thus utilized in the present study  instead of the 
two-stage structural probit approach outlined above. 
 Having estimated the two abnormal return regression equations, Maddala (1991) 
suggests that our next step is to examine whether there are, in fact, any significant changes in 
the estimates of the effect of the explanatory variables. This is done by comparing the 
coefficients on the variables in the regression equations estimated with and without 
correction for the self-selectivity bias. This will indicate whether ignoring the “non-random” 
selection process has indeed produced misleading results.  
 I next proceed to estimate what the “predicted” abnormal return would have been 
had the firm used the alternate disbursement choice, by applying the relevant variables into 
the estimated CAR models. This, in effect, is the main purpose of the analysis. In this 
procedure the selectivity terms are not needed and, hence, are omitted. The purpose of 
 43 
estimating the selectivity equations (3a) and (4a) was to obtain estimates of βD and βR that 
are free of the selectivity bias and hence any further analyses uses these parameter estimates. 
If managers are making their disbursement decisions in the best interests of the firm’s 
stockholders then I would expect that the difference between the excess returns resulting 
from the firm’s disbursement choice and the predicted excess returns from choosing the 
alternate payout method would be positive and statistically significant. This is tested by 
examining the difference between the mean abnormal returns for firms that made a particular 
disbursement choice and the mean predicted abnormal return for those firms had they chosen 
the alternate method. 
 The final step in the two-stage procedure is to estimate a benefit differential 
(BENEFIT), calculated as the difference between the predicted abnormal returns for all firms 
if they choose to use dividend payments and the predicted abnormal returns had they instead 
chosen a stock repurchase (that is, RiDi RACRAC ˆˆ − ). This additional explanatory variable is 
then included in the disbursement choice equation (5), producing a “structural form selection 
index”, which is re-estimated by the probit maximum likelihood method. A statistically 
significant coefficient on the benefit differential variable indicates that managers make their 
choice of a disbursement method on the basis of the differential in the expected abnormal 
returns (net-benefit). 
 To estimate equations (3a) and (4a) I need to provide unbiased estimates of the 
unconditional CAR experienced by firms around the announcement of the relevant 
disbursements. This is done using standard event-study procedures employing estimated 
market-model parameters. For this purpose I use returns for each firm (from the CRSP data 
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base) over 190 trading days (approximately nine calendar months) from day -210 to day -21, 
relative to the announcement day, to estimate a market model of the form: 
 Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit (10) 
 Rit is the return on firm i’s stock on day t, Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-
weighted index15 on day t, εit is the error term in the model (assumed to be normally 
distributed with a common mean but unequal or nonhomogenous variance -- that is, 
heteroscedastic), and αi and βi are the parameters that will be estimated in the OLS 
regression. The estimation period is chosen so as to be close enough to the event period to 
approximate the true beta during the announcement interval while being far enough to be 
uncontaminated by the event. Using the returns generated from the estimated model, the 
abnormal return for firm i’s stock on day t (ARit) is calculated as the deviation of the 
predicted (estimated) return for day t from the actual return on day t. That is: 
 ( )mtiiititit RRAR βαε ˆˆ +−==  (11) 
 The abnormal returns for each firm are then summed for days -1 to +1 to arrive at the 
three day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement: 
 i it
t
CAR AR=
=−
+∑
1
1
 (12) 
 I include in the announcement interval day -1 because a leakage of information may 
cause a substantial price reaction on this day while day +1 is included to account for 
announcements that are made after the stock market has closed for trading. The CARi values 
are then used in the OLS (or WLS) estimations of equations (3a) and (4a). The significance 
of the coefficients on βD and βR, as well as the coefficients on the self-selectivity variable, can 
then be examined by using standard t-test statistics. 
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3.2.1 Tests for Unconditional Wealth Effects 
 
 I am primarily interested in examining the disbursement choices of managers and its 
impact on stockholders’ wealth as measured by the abnormal returns observed around the 
disbursement announcement. However, Ross (1989) shows that increases in the rate of 
flow of idiosyncratic information manifest themselves in increases in stock price 
volatility. In light of this, changes in the variance of the stock returns distribution may be 
mistakenly identified as wealth effects. Sanders and Robins (1991) (SR) show that 
potential bias may exist in the size of the abnormal return (and, hence, the reported “wealth” 
effect) when an event induces a change in the residual variance of the abnormal returns 
distribution ( i2σ ) and the mean-effects test procedures applied to detect wealth effects do not 
incorporate such variance changes (for example, the z-test frequently used in event studies 
would here have a magnifying effect with a tendency to reject a correct null too often). 
Under these circumstances, the researcher is likely to misclassify as a wealth effect the 
information effect represented by the change in variance. 
 Whereas both wealth and variance effects relate to the release of “new” information 
to the market, a practical distinction between the two may be considered by looking at the 
level of uncertainty contained in the information released. That is, where the new 
information is known to contain either “good” or “bad” news about the firm, then the market 
will incorporate this as a wealth effect. However, when there is uncertainty as to the nature 
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of the new information (whether it is “good” or “bad” news), then this will be incorporated 
by the market as a variance effect.  
 To avoid potential bias in misrepresenting the wealth effect resulting from the 
managers’ disbursement choices, I test the following hypothesis prior to the self-selectivity 
modeling: 
Hypothesis: Did the disbursement event unconditionally change the mean of the 
abnormal returns distribution? 
 To provide an unconditional test of the mean CAR around the event announcement, 
Robins and Sanders (1993) (RS) suggested a multiple-day event period analog to the t-
statistic developed by Collins and Dent (1984)(CD) to test single-day average abnormal 
returns measures. The CD statistic is shown to be asymptotically the best linear unbiased 
estimator of the average abnormal return and incorporates in its formulation any serial 
correlation between the market returns over the estimation period. The RS analog is 
calculated as follows: 
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 ACAR, the average cumulative abnormal return, is calculated using the formula: 
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 where: 
 i2σ  ≡ residual variance from estimation of the market model for firm i 
 K ≡ 3; the number of days accumulated in the calculation of CARi 
 Ti ≡ number of returns used to estimate the market model for firm i 
 rmt ≡ return to the market portfolio on event-day t 
 rmτ ≡ return to the market portfolio on estimation day τ 
 mr  ≡ mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period 
 
 This procedure, in effect, employs an estimated generalized least squares 
methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARi). Under the null hypothesis 
that the average cumulative abnormal returns equals zero, tCAR follows a Student-t distribution 
with I-1 degrees of freedom. For comparative purposes, I also calculate the simple average 
cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) and a Z-test based upon the average standardized 
cumulative abnormal return (ASCAR), as these are frequently reported in the event study 
literature. These are: 
 AVG CAR
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 Although the Z-test adjusts for and incorporates any serial correlation in the 
prediction errors (abnormal returns), it nevertheless ignores any event induced changes in the 
residual variance of the abnormal returns distribution. 
 Further, Denis and Kadlec (1994) observed that non-synchronous trading -- the 
tendency for prices recorded at the end of a day to represent the outcome of a transaction 
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occurring earlier in that day -- causes serial cross-correlations in security returns, leading to 
biased estimates of systematic risk when using simple ordinary least squares regression to 
estimate the market model. In addition, they find significant decreases in trading activity 
following share repurchases. Given that I have required firms in my sample to have no 
missing returns during the announcement period and no more than 15 days missing returns 
during the estimation periods, this is not expected to be a cause for concern in this study16. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection and Description 
 
 Due to the nature of the specific research to be undertaken, the data sample that I use 
in this study is taken from various sources. The sample covers the period 1984 - 1995 and 
consists of the following sub-samples: 
 
 1. The sample of firms with dividend increases are selected by randomly 
searching the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns Master File for 
firms with increases in consecutive regular quarterly dividends per share over the period 
covered by the study. In addition, no other type of distribution must be made by the firm 
during the period between the two quarterly dividends. This comprises all firms listed on 
either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or 
the North American Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) System. 
 The market reaction theories presented earlier predict a price reaction only to 
announcements of unexpected dividend increases. In an attempt to capture this, I require that 
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the increase must be at least 10 percent in order for the announcement to be included in the 
sample. This lower bound of 10 percent ensures that only economically significant 
dividend changes are included in the sample17. In addition, to minimize the effect of 
outliers, I impose an upper bound of 700 percent on the size of the dividend increase. To 
quantify the dividend changes I apply the naïve expectations model, which states: 
i t i tD D,
^
,= −1 
That is, the best estimate at time (t-1) of dividends in time (t) is the dividends paid at time (t-
1). Using this model, unexpected dividends are thus represented by the actual amount of the 
dividend increase. 
 The use of the naïve model is supported by the empirical observation that firms 
generally do not change their dollar dividends frequently and hence follow a fairly stable, 
predictable dividend payment policy. Damodaran (2001), using data from Compustat, 
reports that between 1989 and 1998, in most years the number of firms that do not change 
their dollar dividends far exceeds the number that do18.   
 Lintner (1956) in his classic study on how managers make dividend decisions, found 
that they stabilize dividends with gradual, sustainable increases whenever possible, establish 
an appropriate target payout ratio, and avoid dividend cuts, if at all possible. Fama and 
Babiak (1968) reevaluated Lintner’s model and concluded that it continues to perform well 
relative to alternative specifications using both economywide earnings and dividend data as 
well as data for individual firms.  
 In addition to this (that is, to identify and quantify unexpected dividend signals) the 
dividend increase must be the first in any series of consecutive regular quarterly increases of 
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similar magnitude. That is, in a series of consecutive quarterly increases, I exclude from the 
sample all subsequent increases unless they represent a percentage change larger than that 
observed in the previous quarter. 
 
 2. The initial sample of specially designated dividends is taken from the CRSP 
daily master files. To be included in my initial sample (through searching on distributions 
coded as “year-end”, “extra”, or “special”) the distribution must be the first specially 
designated dividend declared by the firm in at least a 2-year period. This is to avoid pulling 
those distributions labeled as specially designated dividends but that are in reality annual 
dividends. I also use a similar procedure to search for special dividend announcements on 
the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) of the LEXIS/NEXIS reference database. 
 
 3. I identify the initial sample of open market repurchase programs and 
repurchase tender offer announcements from the following sources: 
 
• The appendix to Comment and Jarrell (1991) covering announcements from 
1984 to 1989. 
• A general search of the repurchases database of the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). 
• A general search of the WSJI of the LEXIS/NEXIS reference database. 
• A general search of the CRSP master file. 
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 This sample is reduced by exclusion of repurchase offers available only to odd-lot 
holders, those offers by closed-end investment companies, and offers whose intention was to 
take the firm private.  
 The initial samples are reduced by applying the following screens to the data: 
1. Since the model implies a mutually exclusive choice between dividends and 
repurchases, I exclude from the sample firms that concurrently announce both a 
dividend and a stock repurchase.19 
2. Firms must have returns data available on CRSP for at least 250 trading days 
(one calendar year) before and 150 trading days (seven calendar months) after 
the date of the disbursement announcement. In addition, there can be no more 
than 15 days missing returns during the estimation period from 210 to 21 days 
prior to the event date, and no missing returns over the 3-day event period. 
3. Firms must have the relevant accounting data available on the COMPUSTAT 
database for calculation of the various measures used in the decision models 
(these are detailed in a later section). 
4. I eliminate from the sample financial firms (SIC codes 6000 - 6999), utilities 
(SIC codes 4900 - 4949), and regulated telephone companies (SIC code 4813)20. 
 Event dates for the various announcements are taken from the relevant sources (that 
is, CRSP, WSJI, SDC database, or Comment & Jarrell’s Appendix). The final sample 
consists of 2,423 dividend increases, 1,931 open market repurchases, 313 special dividends, 
and 222 repurchase tender offer announcements. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
announcements across the sample period, broken down with respect to disbursement type 
and year.  
 It appears that the observations are fairly evenly spread across the sample period. 
The notable exception to this is the number of open market repurchase announcements in 
1987 and 1989/90. This can be accounted for by the documented increase in repurchase 
authorizations around the period of the stock market crashes in 1987 and 1990, supposedly 
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in response to the belief that stocks were highly undervalued at these times. Overall, the 
sample of disbursement announcements does not display any major problems of clustering in 
any single year. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Sample Announcements by Type and Year 
 Announcement Type  
 
Year 
 
Dividend 
Increases 
Open Market 
Repurchases 
Special 
Dividends 
Repurchase 
Tender Offers 
 
TOTAL
1984 203 117 54 22 396 
1985 217 55 12 18 302 
1986 168 62 15 15 260 
1987 230 254 16 10 510 
1988 268 61 45 15 389 
1989 268 167 36 29 500 
1990 222 307 43 19 591 
1991 147 110 25 23 305 
1992 157 171 17 16 361 
1993 168 155 21 20 364 
1994 188 240 16 17 461 
1995 187 232 13 18 450 
TOTAL 2423 1931 313 222 4889 
 
3.4 Identification of Explanatory Variables 
 
 Considering the theories developed and discussed in chapters 1 and 2, a number of 
factors emerge as potential discriminators of disbursement type. Much support for dividends 
as a signaling device has been provided by many of the researchers cited previously. As 
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discussed above, the characteristics of the signal for stock repurchases appear to be distinct 
from that for regular dividends. Based on the overwhelming support for information 
signaling by financial researchers, proxies for signaling should be useful in empirically 
differentiating between managers' choices of the form of their cash distributions.  
 I use two proxies to “measure” managers’ signaling of private information and the 
level of information asymmetry. These are (i) the change in annual earnings per share 
between the year prior to and the year subsequent to the disbursement, scaled by the firm’s 
stock price 5 days before the announcement date (DEPS), and (ii) the residual volatility in 
daily stock returns in the year preceding the event announcement, (RVOL), measured as the 
standard deviation in the market-adjusted daily stock returns.  
 DEPS is used to proxy for signaling since the theory posits that improved operating 
performance is included in the “content” of the signal. Dierkins(1991) and Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) suggest that information asymmetry (high when managers have a 
relatively large amount of value-relevant, firm-specific information that is not shared by the 
market) can be captured by the market-adjusted standard deviation of the daily stock price 
abnormal returns (Rit – Rmt). Hence I use RVOL as a proxy for the level of information 
asymmetry. Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that greater information asymmetry should be 
characteristic of the stock repurchasing firms relative to firms that use dividend payments. 
Hence, I expect comparatively larger values for these variables to be associated with the use 
of repurchases, while smaller values should be associated with dividends. 
 The signaling hypothesis also posits that repurchasing firms are undervalued and, in 
this regard, I would expect the market’s valuation of firms utilizing repurchases to be lower, 
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ceteris paribus, than for those distributing cash through dividends. Tobin’s Q, (TOBINQ) a 
measure of the firm’s investment opportunity set, is used as a proxy for classifying firms as 
either growth firms / value-maximizers (Q>1) or overinvestors (Q<1). I adopt Chung and 
Pruitt’s (1994) equation 2 to proxy for Tobin’s Q: 
q = (MVE + PS +DEBT) / TA 
where MVE is the market value of the firm’s common stock, PS is the liquidating value of 
the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities 
net of its short-term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the 
book value of the total assets of the firm. They show that this approximation to Q explains at 
least 96.6 percent of the variability in the more theoretically correct model of Tobin’s Q. 
 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find that firms with Q<1 have, on average, greater 
stock price reactions to dividend changes than do firms with Q>1. Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1994) also find evidence that Tobin’s Q and dividend yield are negatively correlated. Since 
Q is used as a measure of growth opportunities I expect that higher ratios should be 
associated with higher-valued firms and lower ratios associated with lower valued firms. 
Because the signaling/undervaluation hypothesis suggests that repurchases are used mainly 
by firms that are undervalued, I expect firms choosing dividends to be those with higher 
ratios for Tobin’s Q. 
 Closely linked to this is the use of a proxy measure for the level of free cash flow 
existing within the firm at the time of the disbursement decision, (FCF). As previously used 
by Maquiera and Megginson (1994), this is calculated as the after-tax undistributed cash 
flow of the company (cash flow from operations net of debt payments, preferred dividends 
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and common dividends) divided by the market value of its equity. Free cash flow theory 
posits that corporate disbursements are used to reduce free cash flows and thereby lower the 
associated mitigating agency costs. Taking this into consideration, as well as the empirical 
observation that the monies distributed by companies during stock repurchases usually 
represent a larger fraction of their outstanding equity as compared with dividends,21 I can 
expect higher levels of free cash flow to be associated with greater utilization of stock 
repurchases. However, as discussed earlier, only a small percentage of repurchases should be 
undertaken for the specific purpose of reducing agency costs -- since empirical observations 
suggest that repurchases usually involve external financing. In this regard, it is not certain, 
ex-ante, how well the level of free cash flow will perform as a discriminatory variable. 
 A potentially useful factor in the model, as suggested by Bagnoli, Gordon, and 
Lipman (1989) and Bagwell (1991), is a measure for corporate control, specifically defense 
against hostile takeovers (TKOVER). This is introduced as a dummy variable representing 
the presence of such activities facing the firm within one year preceding the disbursement 
announcement22. In the present framework only stock repurchases has been suggested as a 
possible mechanism for such control. I would thus expect a variable measuring the presence 
of takeover activity (and possibly the existence of agency problems) to be related to the form 
of disbursement used by the firm. 
 One testable prediction of the capital structure hypothesis discussed in chapter 2 
(Section 2.2.2) is that repurchasing firms should have less leverage than non-repurchasing 
firms. In the decision model, I use the firm’s debt/equity ratio (LTDEQ) -- measured as long-
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term debt divided by the book value of equity -- as a measure of the firm’s financial 
leverage. 
 Fenn and Liang (2000), in studying the relationship between open market 
repurchases and dividend payment, find that repurchases are positively related to proxies for 
free cash flow and negatively related to proxies for marginal financing costs. Firm size has 
been empirically related to both market return and disbursement characteristics, and is a 
plausible proxy (inverse) for marginal financing costs. Hence, I include a factor for size, 
(SIZE), calculated as the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to 
the announcement date. However, since Fama and French (2000) conclude that smaller firms 
are less likely to pay dividends, the ex-ante relationship of firm size to disbursement choice 
is not certain. Fenn and Liang (2000) also conclude that the presence and level of 
management stock options induces a preference for open market repurchases compared to 
dividend payments. Given this, I include a proxy for management stock options (MNSTK) in 
the disbursement decision equation. The proxy I use is adopted from their paper and is 
calculated as the number of common shares reserved for conversion for stock options, 
convertible securities, and warrants, divided by the total number of shares the firm has 
outstanding. Given their finding that managerial stock incentives might serve to mitigate 
agency costs I would expect a positive relationship between managerial stock options and 
the abnormal returns around disbursement announcements. 
 Dividend yield is also expected to be an important variable in the firm’s choice 
between dividends and repurchases. This can be considered as a proxy for a firm’s “tax-
clientele”. The variable DIVYLD represents the average dividend yield of the firm for the 
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three years leading up to the disbursement announcement. Based on the clientele argument, 
firms with high dividend yields prior to the disbursement will be more likely to continue 
using dividends as a means to distribute cash to shareholders. Additionally, if stock 
repurchases and dividends are partial signaling substitutes, then I would expect the stock 
market’s price reaction to a repurchase announcement to be negatively related to the firm’s 
prior dividend yield. 
 The financial flexibility hypotheses of Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan, 
Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) indicate that measures of earnings volatility, cash flow 
permanence, and prior stock performance are important in discriminating between dividends 
and repurchases. In similar fashion, I use EARVOL – the standard deviation in the ratio of 
operating income to total assets of the firm over the five years leading up to the 
announcement – to measure earnings volatility and AVGRET – the average daily stock 
return in the year preceding the announcement – to estimate prior stock performance. I apply 
two variants of their measures of cash flow permanence: RELPERM measures the relative 
proportion of permanent cash flows and is calculated as the average of the ratio of operating 
to total income (operating plus non-operating income) over the three years prior to the 
announcement and CFPERM measures the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from 
operations to total assets in the three years before and after the announcement. 
 Finally, in line with the conclusions of Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (1999) 
that the abnormal returns around dividend announcements are related to the decline in 
systematic risk, I include DBETA in the abnormal returns equations to proxy for the change 
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in systematic risk (measured as the difference in the CRSP market-model beta of the firm, 
estimated for 150 trading days before and after the announcement). 
 Descriptive statistics for each of the factors mentioned above are provided in Table 2 
for the 4,889 firms in the final sample (separated according to the disbursement method 
used). SIZE, AVGRET, CFPERM, and DBETA appear to be approximately normally 
distributed. However, all the other variables display definitely skewed distributions, with the 
means generally being larger than the corresponding median (except for FCF and 
RELPERM that have medians higher than their means). The average size of firms in the 
sample was 19.76 (equivalent to $382 million), while the mean (median) dividend yield was 
2.29 percent (1.81 percent). Only 1.4 percent of firms in the sample faced hostile takeover 
activity within a year preceding the disbursement announcement. 
 From a preliminary analysis of the differences in the means of the variables between 
dividend increasing and open market repurchasing firms, as provided in Table 3, it appears 
that RVOL, TOBINQ, FCF, SIZE, MNSTK, DIVYLD, EARVOL, AVGRET, RELPERM 
and DBETA are the variables of primary interest in discriminating between the disbursement 
types. The mean RVOL for the dividend sample was 1.93 percent while that for the 
repurchase sample was 2.45 percent. TOBINQ and FCF averaged 1.325 (1.078) and 0.045 
(0.012) respectively for dividend increasing (open market repurchasing) firms. Stock 
repurchasing firms also appear to be smaller, with an average equity market value of $304 
million (SIZE = 19.53), compared to $553 million (SIZE = 20.13) for dividend paying firms. 
For the firms using dividends, MNSTK averaged 10.99 percent of shares outstanding while 
stock repurchasing firms had an average of 17.79 percent. Dividend paying firms had an 
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average DIVYLD of 2.28 percent compared to 1.62 percent for repurchasing firms. Dividend 
increasing firms also had an average of 0.0319, 0.00095, 0.9316, and 0.00016 for EARVOL, 
AVGRET, RELPERM, and DBETA respectively, while the averages for repurchasing firms 
were 0.0438, 0.00033, 0.8888, and -0.0461 respectively. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision Variables in Final Sample 
Variables measured are:  DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; 
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as 
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a 
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); 
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the 
total number of shares outstanding;  DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the  
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to 
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM 
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the 
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the 
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement. 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DEPS 0.00901 0.00431 0.57053 -26.33846 22.45415 
RVOL 0.02209 0.01911 0.01176 0.00689 0.14784 
TOBINQ 1.17792 0.90518 1.02008 -0.58456 12.92904 
FCF 0.01489 0.05680 0.38726 -14.9913 2.34022 
TKOVER 0.01374 0 0.11642 0 1 
LTDEQ
1
 54.90368 24.75900 407.41702 -2217.60
1
 15986.59 
SIZE 19.75509 19.69585 1.96581 14.26429 25.15223 
MNSTK 0.14291 0.08114 0.31562 0 16.53088 
DIVYLD 2.28767 1.81400 5.30069 0 150.71067 
EARVOL 0.03921 0.02890 0.05124 0.00162 2.61573 
AVGRET 0.00069 0.00067 0.00135 -0.00552 0.01181 
RELPERM 0.91318 0.94427 0.46380 -21.21218 13.96224 
CFPERM -0.00750 -0.00635 0.06146 -0.42028 0.73210 
DBETA -0.01750 -0.02345 0.51662 -5.19600 3.18831 
1 Note: Because I use book value of equity, firms can have negative debt/equity ratios due to the effect 
of accumulated losses (resulting in negative stockholder’s equity). 
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Table 3. Sample Characteristics: Dividend Increases versus Open Market Repurchases 
Variables measured are:  DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; 
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as 
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a 
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); 
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the 
total number of shares outstanding;  DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the  
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to 
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM 
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the 
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the 
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement. 
 DIVIDEND INCREASES  OPEN-MARKET REPURCHASES 
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
DEPS 0.00625 0.00447  -0.01430 0.00386 
RVOL* 0.01925 0.01760  0.02450 0.02134 
TOBINQ* 1.32534 1.03579  1.07752 0.82884 
FCF* 0.04508 0.05680  0.01205 0.05816 
TKOVER 0.01007 0  0.00950 0 
LTDEQ 51.46277 25.36400  42.54777 22.89700 
SIZE* 20.13075 20.10306  19.53346 19.41784 
MNSTK* 0.10986 0.06668  0.17794 0.10742 
DIVYLD* 2.28276 2.01350  1.62104 1.17600 
EARVOL* 0.03194 0.02490  0.04377 0.03222 
AVGRET* 0.00095 0.00086  0.00033 0.00033 
RELPERM* 0.93160 0.95098  0.88879 0.93950 
CFPERM -0.00848 -0.00728  -0.00671 -0.00542 
DBETA* 0.00016 -0.01322  -0.04610 -0.04002 
* A t-test for difference among the means was significant for these variables at the 10% level. 
The means of the variables for special dividend and repurchase tender offer firms are 
provided in Table 4. Here it appears that DEPS, RVOL, TOBINQ, TKOVER, SIZE, 
MNSTK, and DIVYLD are the primary discriminatory variables.  
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Table 4. Sample Characteristics: Special Dividends versus Repurchase Tender Offers 
Variables measured are:  DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; 
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as 
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a 
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); 
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of 
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the 
total number of shares outstanding;  DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the  
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to 
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM 
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the 
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the 
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement. 
 SPECIAL DIVIDENDS  REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS 
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
DEPS* -0.00163 0.00386  0.26398 0.00753 
RVOL* 0.02516 0.02189  0.02771 0.02098 
TOBINQ* 0.93233 0.68135  0.78597 0.64562 
FCF -0.10372 0.04284  -0.12766 0.04255 
TKOVER* 0.03165 0  0.06726 0 
LTDEQ 117.40620 19.53300  115.50317 48.35600 
SIZE* 18.65012 18.55814  19.12846 18.91800 
MNSTK* 0.11252 0.06107  0.23950 0.13031 
DIVYLD* 6.59464 2.77967  2.22082 1.55733 
EARVOL 0.05139 0.04012  0.06205 0.03856 
AVGRET 0.00093 0.00076  0.00081 0.00072 
RELPERM 0.91767 0.92530  0.92073 0.93579 
CFPERM -0.00927 -0.00821  -0.00115 -0.00312 
DBETA -0.00643 0.00680  0.02681 -0.03629 
* A t-test for difference among the means was significant for these variables at the 10% level. 
 
DEPS averaged -0.0016 for firms paying special dividends and 0.264 for firms 
utilizing repurchase tender offers. The mean RVOL for the dividend sample was 2.52 
percent while that for the repurchase sample was 2.77 percent. TOBINQ averaged 0.932 and 
0.786 respectively for dividend paying and repurchasing firms. Only 3.17 percent of 
dividend paying firms faced hostile takeover activity within a year of the dividend 
announcement, compared to 6.73 percent of the firms using stock repurchases. Stock 
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repurchasing firms are also larger, with an average equity market value of $203 million 
(SIZE = 19.13), compared to $126 million (SIZE = 18.65) for dividend paying firms. For the 
firms using dividends, MNSTK averaged 11.25 percent of shares outstanding while stock 
repurchasing firms had an average of 23.95 percent. Dividend paying firms had an average 
DIVYLD of 6.59 percent compared to 2.22 percent for repurchasing firms. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
 In this chapter I have sought to provide an outline of the hypotheses that were 
examined, the sources of the data, and the techniques and procedures that I used in 
addressing the issues presented in this study.    
 I have sought to address the self-selectivity problem inherent in studies of this nature 
by simultaneously modeling the manager’s decision process and the stock market’s reaction 
to the announcement of the firm’s chosen disbursement type through a full information 
maximum likelihood modeling technique. The expectation is that the firm’s disbursement 
choice will be positively related to the associated stock price implications of the choice, with 
managers acting to maximize their stockholders’ wealth. 
 Based on the foregoing discussions, I have summarized in Table 5 the variables 
that are used in the analyses and their expected signs in the relevant equations, as well as 
the rationale behind their inclusion. These are analyzed and the findings discussed in the 
following chapter and form the foundation of the concluding section. 
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Table 5. Proxy Variables Used in Statistical Analyses 
 Hypothesized Sign  
Proxy Choice Benefits Regression  
Variable Equation Dividend Repurchase Rationale 
DEPS -ve +ve +ve Signaling 
RVOL -ve +ve +ve Asymmetric information 
TOBINQ +ve -ve -ve Undervaluation 
FCF -ve / +ve +ve +ve Agency, free cash flow 
TKOVER -ve neutral -ve Corporate control 
LTDEQ +ve -ve -ve Capital structure 
hypothesis 
SIZE -ve / +ve -ve -ve Financing cost 
MNSTK -ve -ve -ve Managerial incentives 
DIVYLD +ve +ve -ve Clientele 
EARVOL -ve -ve -ve Financial flexibility 
AVGRET +ve +ve +ve Financial flexibility 
RELPERM +ve +ve +ve Cash flow permanence 
CFPERM +ve +ve +ve Cash flow permanence 
DBETA23 -- +ve neutral Risk signaling 
BENEFIT +ve -- -- Wealth maximization 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Interpretation 
 
 Due to the large number of variables involved in the regression models considered in 
this research, the possibility exists that strong or severe multicollinearity could be present in 
the sample.24 As a measure of the degree of multicollinearity in the sample, I examine the 
pairwise correlations among the quantitative variables. From Table 6 it can be seen that a 
number of pairs of factors have correlation coefficients larger than 0.10. The largest of these 
are 0.579 between RVOL and SIZE and 0.376 between TOBINQ and SIZE. The other 
coefficients above 0.10 are between DEPS and CFPERM, RVOL and EARVOL, RVOL and 
AVGRET, TOBINQ and AVGRET, TOBINQ and CFPERM, and FCF and DIVYLD. From 
this cursory examination, it would not appear that multicollinearity is a major problem in the 
present sample. 
 
4.1 Unconditional Wealth Effects 
 
 The question I sought to answer was whether the disbursement events 
unconditionally changed the mean of the abnormal returns distributions, resulting in a 
statistically significant wealth effect (as measured by the three day cumulative abnormal 
return).  
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix of Factors in the Decision Model 
Factors: DEPS RVOL TOBINQ FCF LTDEQ SIZE MNSTK DIVYLD EARVOL AVGRET RELPERM CFPERM DBETA 
DEPS 1.000             
RVOL 0.053 1.000            
TOBINQ 0.015 -0.102* 1.000           
FCF -0.029 -0.098 0.032 1.000          
LTDEQ 0.044 0.050 -0.016 -0.071 1.000         
SIZE -0.021 -0.579* 0.376* 0.071 -0.009 1.000        
MNSTK 0.034 0.058 -0.052 -0.045 0.036 -0.034 1.000       
DIVYLD -0.005 -0.086 -0.050 -0.263* 0.015 0.034 -0.023 1.000      
EARVOL 0.025 0.272* 0.069 -0.005 0.019 -0.206* 0.040 -0.023 1.000     
AVGRET -0.028 0.135* 0.214* 0.031 0.022 0.064 -0.023 0.031 0.035 1.000    
RELPERM 0.005 -0.007 0.056 0.001 -0.001 0.053 -0.012 -0.007 0.043 0.049 1.000   
CFPERM 0.117* 0.036 0.115* 0.053 0.026 0.017 0.033 -0.058 0.006 0.079 -0.021 1.000  
DBETA -0.008 -0.004 0.013 -0.018 0.049 -0.018 -0.003 0.036 -0.008 0.080 0.003 0.010 1.000 
* - Pairwise correlation coefficients greater than 0.10. 
DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the 
announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long 
Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion 
as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the 
ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM 
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to 
total assets in the three years before and after the announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement. 
 66 
 The results of the tests are presented in Table 7 and Table 8 below. For the sample of 
open market repurchase announcements (provided in Panel A of Table 7), both the 
conditional and unconditional mean effects test statistics, using the standard market model (z 
= 19.97 and t = 11.04 respectively), are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This 
suggests that open market repurchases have elicited a significant wealth effect 
notwithstanding the associated information effect represented by the possible change in the 
variance of the returns distribution. 
 
Table 7. Statistical Results for Unconditional Wealth Effects - Repurchases 
 
Results are given for the market model estimation using returns data from 210 to 21 days before the event. 
Standard t and z tests are calculated based on an unconditional average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR as 
per Robins and Sanders (1993)) and a simple average cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) for the 3-day 
event window from day -1 to +1. 
 
Panel A: Open Market Stock Repurchases 
Sample Size 1931 
ACAR 0.0127* 
t-statistic 11.04 
AVGCAR 0.0204* 
z-statistic 19.97 
Panel B: Repurchase Tender Offers 
Sample Size 222 
ACAR 0.0230* 
t-statistic 6.12 
AVGCAR 0.0271* 
z-statistic 11.54 
* - Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test 
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 The qualitative results for the Repurchase Tender Offer sample are similar to those 
for the sample of open market repurchases. Both the conditional and unconditional mean 
effects test statistics are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 In general, the observed stock market reactions for the open market repurchase 
sample are in accord with the results of earlier studies, with an AVGCAR of 2.0 percent. 
However, the AVGCAR for the Repurchase Tender Offer sample appears somewhat low 
(2.7%) compared with an average of between 5 percent and 9 percent from previous 
studies.25 
 
Table 8. Statistical Results for Unconditional Wealth Effects - Dividend 
Announcements 
 
Results are given for the market model estimation using returns data from 210 to 21 days before the event. 
Standard t and z tests are calculated based on an unconditional average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR as 
per Robins and Sanders (1993)) and a simple average cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) for the 3-day 
event window from day -1 to +1. 
 
Panel A: Dividend Increases 
Sample Size 2423 
ACAR 0.0071* 
t-statistic 10.16 
AVGCAR 0.0086* 
z-statistic 13.21 
Panel B: Special Dividends 
Sample Size 313 
ACAR 0.0232* 
t-statistic 6.28 
AVGCAR 0.0323* 
z-statistic 14.30 
* - Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test 
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 Table 8 provides results for the statistical tests of the stock market’s reaction to 
dividend announcements. From Panel A, the information effect for dividend increase 
announcements, represented by the change in the mean of the returns distribution, is 
statistically significant and positive (AVGCAR of 0.86 percent and z-statistic = 13.21). 
Similar results are displayed for the sample of Special Dividends with statistically significant 
conditional and unconditional wealth effects. The reported AVGCARs are also similar to 
what has been reported in earlier studies26. 
 
4.2 Results for Self-Selectivity Models 
 
 Having established from the previous section that the disbursement events in fact 
yielded statistically significant wealth effects, I can thus proceed confidently to address 
the issue of self-selectivity. The selectivity models were developed using the full 
information maximum likelihood approach (FIML) as outlined in chapter 3 of this study. 
 
4.2.1  Reduced Form Probit Model 
 
 Maximum likelihood estimates of the reduced form probit choice models, that 
include all predetermined explanatory variables, are presented in Table 9. For the sample 
of dividend increasing and open market stock repurchasing firms, the reduced form 
estimation results are as suggested from the univariate results in Table 3 and Table 4. The 
probability of utilizing a dividend increase versus making an open market stock 
repurchase is statistically significantly positively related to the level of undervaluation 
 69 
(TOBINQ), the free cash flows of the firm (FCF), the average dividend yield (DIVYLD), 
and the one year average daily stock return prior to announcement (AVGRET). 
 
Table 9. Reduced Form Probit Models Predicting the Choice of Disbursement 
Results for the probit maximum likelihood decision models (with dependent variable I=1 for dividends and 0 for repurchases) 
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach. DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the 
announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the 
announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and 
Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the 
announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the 
natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved 
for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the 
three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over 
the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; 
RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; 
CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after 
the announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement 
 
Variable 
Dividend Increases versus 
Open Market Repurchases 
 Special Dividends versus 
Repurchase Tender Offers 
CONSTANT 2.21106*  3.89893* 
DEPS -0.00475  -0.41001 
RVOL -40.39690*  -19.44250* 
TOBINQ 0.11080*  0.30171* 
FCF 0.33359*  0.05540 
TKOVER -0.07152  -0.45758 
LTDEQ 0.00018  0.00019 
SIZE -0.07098*  -0.18201* 
MNSTK -0.27700*  -0.98729* 
DIVYLD 0.03345*  0.05091* 
EARVOL -5.43440*  -1.50950 
AVGRET 270.97200*  80.58510** 
RELPERM 0.04654  0.02881 
CFPERM -0.96587*  -0.57376 
DBETA 0.05059  -0.08330 
Chi-Squared 773.33*  101.38* 
Pseudo R2 0.4937  0.6296 
% Correctly Classified 67.73  69.16 
Sample Size 4354  535 
* (**) - Statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively. 
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 The probability of utilizing a dividend increase versus making an open market 
stock repurchase is statistically significantly negatively related to the residual volatility in 
the firm’s daily stock returns (RVOL), the market value of the firm’s equity (SIZE), the 
extent of available managerial stock options (MNSTK), the volatility of the firm’s 
operating earnings (EARVOL), and the difference in the levels of permanent cash flows 
of the firm pre and post announcement (CFPERM). 
 However, the coefficients on the change in annual earnings per share (DEPS), the 
firms exposure to hostile takeovers (TKOVER), the debt to equity ratio (LTDEQ), the 
relative proportion of permanent cash flows (RELPERM), and the change in systematic 
risk (DBETA) are not statistically significant. The signs of the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables are generally as hypothesized (see Table 5) with the only exception 
being the negative sign on CFPERM. This lends support to the theoretical underpinnings 
of the model specification, as developed in the earlier chapters of this study, and thus 
supports the findings of earlier research in this area.  
 The model had a high pseudo-R2 of 49percent  attesting to the overall explanatory 
power of the reduced form choice equation. The model was able to correctly classify the 
disbursement type approximately seventy percent of the time. The statistically significant 
Chi-squared value also indicates that at least one of the discriminatory variables is able to 
detect significant differences between firms that increase dividends and those that 
repurchase their stock. 
 Results are qualitatively similar for firms choosing between a special dividend 
and a repurchase tender offer. All the coefficients on the explanatory variables have the 
expected sign, with the exception of CFPERM (but, the coefficient is not statistically 
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significant) although the t-tests are generally not as strong. For this sub-sample DEPS, 
FCF, TKOVER, LTDEQ, EARVOL, RELPERM, and DBETA are also not statistically 
significant determinants of disbursement choice. 
 
4.2.2  Abnormal Return Regression Equations 
 
 The next stage of the analysis required the fitted values from the reduced form 
probit equations being used to construct the inverse Mills ratios for the dividend and 
repurchase sub-samples. The abnormal return equations (equations 3a and 4a) obtained 
by adding these variables to the corresponding abnormal return equations (equations 3 
and 4) are now estimated consistently (using maximum likelihood (ML) for the FIML 
approach. These results are presented in Table 10 for the dividend increasing and open 
market repurchase sub-sample and Table 11 for the special dividend and repurchase 
tender offer sub-sample. 
 The question of the existence of a self-selection bias is examined from these 
results in two ways. First, I examine the difference in the coefficient estimates between 
the selectivity model and the standard OLS model and second, I consider the statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the selectivity variable (that is, the inverse Mills ratio 
variable (Wi)). For the dividend increasing firms there is very little difference between 
the OLS and the selectivity coefficients. With the exception of the MNSTK variable 
(which is not statistically significant), the largest percentage difference between the 
coefficients on the alternate models is 9.48%. Further, the signs of the coefficients are 
identical between both models (again with the exception of the sign on MNSTK). At this 
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preliminary stage then, it would appear that the dividend increasing firms do not self-
select, but would have created more wealth for their stockholders by offering to instead 
repurchase their shares. This is further supported by the lack of a statistically significant 
coefficient on the selectivity variable (Wi).  
Notwithstanding the failure to detect a significant sample selection bias, the 
abnormal returns equations are in accord with the findings of other researchers and our 
earlier expectations. The signs of the coefficients are generally as expected (the exception 
to this only applies to variables that are not statistically significant in the regression 
equation, that is, TOBINQ, LTDEQ, MNSTK, and AVGRET). The variables that are 
statistically significantly related to the disbursement announcement abnormal returns for 
the dividend increasing firms are DEPS, SIZE, DIVYLD, CFPERM, and DBETA, 
indicating that asymmetric information/signaling, clientele effects, and cash flow 
permanence play a role in explaining the observed stock price reaction. 
A contrasting picture emerges for the open market repurchasing firms. The 
coefficient estimates are significantly different on average, and have opposite signs a 
number of times, from the corresponding coefficient estimates using standard ordinary 
least squares without correcting for the selection bias. In fact, the percentage differences 
between the coefficients on the alternate models range from as low as 26 percent to just 
over 2330 percent. Additionally, the estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio 
variable (Wi), which corrects for the selection bias, is negative and statistically 
significant at an alpha of 1 percentage point.  
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Table 10. Comparison of Selection (ML) Model and OLS Coefficient Estimates: Dividend 
Increases and Open Market Repurchases 
Results for the ML regressions with self-selectivity adjustment variable and OLS regressions without the selectivity 
adjustment. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR around the disbursement announcement. Variables measured are: DEPS 
is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in 
daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); 
FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile 
takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt 
to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK 
is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the 
average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating 
income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year 
preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior 
to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three 
years before and after the announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; and Wi is 
the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills Ratio). Significance of independent variables are tested using standard t-tests.
 Parameter Estimates 
 Dividend Increases Sample  Open Market Repurchases Sample 
Independent 
Variables 
ML 
(Selection) 
 
OLS 
% ∆ in 
Coeff. 
 ML 
(Selection) 
 
OLS 
% ∆ in 
Coeff. 
CONSTANT 0.04399** 0.04436* 0.83%  0.11822* -0.00528 2339.36% 
DEPS 0.02941** 0.02938* -0.09%  0.00547** 0.00248 -120.10% 
RVOL 0.52285 0.50400* -3.74%  0.64250* 1.69300* 62.05% 
TOBINQ 0.00100 0.00105 4.19%  0.00976* 0.00284 -243.05% 
FCF 0.00295 0.00311 5.11%  0.00599 -0.00062 1063.58% 
TKOVER -0.00811 -0.00814 0.33%  -0.01984 -0.01574 -26.08% 
LTDEQ
1
 0.00000 0.00000 2.26%  0.00002 0.00001 -64.45% 
SIZE -0.00256** -0.00259* 1.17%  -0.00386* -0.00140 -175.14% 
MNSTK 0.00007 -0.00011 161.38%  -0.02104* -0.01056 -99.28% 
DIVYLD 0.00187* 0.00188* 0.72%  0.00292* 0.00106** -175.99% 
EARVOL -0.02439 -0.02691 9.36%  -0.16614* 0.03399 588.79% 
AVGRET -1.40567 -1.284*** -9.48%  5.54962* -5.64400* 198.33% 
RELPERM 0.00288 0.00291 0.70%  0.01375* 0.01045* -31.55% 
CFPERM 0.03236*** 0.03195*** -1.27%  0.07305* 0.10900* 32.98% 
DBETA 0.00915* 0.00917* 0.20%  -0.00061 -0.00360 83.02% 
Wi -0.0008    -0.0737*   
F-statistic  10.510*  11.190*    17.990*  17.460*  
Adjusted R2  0.056  0.056    0.117  0.107  
Sample Size 2423  1931 
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively 
1 Note: Although the coefficients are rounded to zero the percentage differences reflect the change in the 
actual and not rounded coefficients (hence, non-zero percentage differences). 
 
From equations (3a) and (4a) in the earlier development of the structural model a 
negative (positive) coefficient on this selectivity adjustment variable for the repurchasing 
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(dividend) sample indicates that the firm is better off choosing this form of disbursement, 
compared with the alternative, on the expectation of a higher wealth effect. 
 At this preliminary stage then, it would appear that the repurchasing firms exhibit 
a severe sample selection bias, and are in fact making their disbursement decisions in the 
best interests of their stockholders. The abnormal returns equation seems fairly well 
specified, with an adjusted R2 value of 11.7 percent and with most of the variables being 
statistically significant. For the open market repurchase sample DEPS, RVOL, TOBINQ, 
SIZE, MNSTK, DIVYLD, EARVOL, AVGRET, RELPERM, and CFPERM are 
significantly related to the abnormal returns indicating that asymmetric 
information/signaling, undervaluation, managerial incentives, financial flexibility, and 
cash flow permanence also provide insight into the observed stock price reaction. 
From these results I want to argue that there is a significant selection bias in the 
sample of repurchasing firms, and that any analysis ignoring the selection process will 
produce misleading results. This indicates that when firms elect to repurchase their stock, 
they do so because they gain more, other things being equal, than if they had instead 
utilized a dividend increase for the cash distribution. 
 Table 11 report results for the abnormal returns equations for the special 
dividends and repurchase tender offer firms. While qualitatively similar, the results are, 
nevertheless, statistically much weaker than the results reported for the dividend 
increasing and open market repurchasing firms.  
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Table 11. Comparison of Selection (ML) Model and OLS Coefficient Estimates: Special 
Dividends and Repurchase Tender Offers 
Results for the ML regressions with self-selectivity adjustment variable and OLS regressions without the selectivity 
adjustment. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR around the disbursement announcement. Variables measured are: DEPS 
is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in 
daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); 
FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile 
takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt 
to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK 
is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the 
average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating 
income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year 
preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior 
to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three 
years before and after the announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; and Wi is 
the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills Ratio). Significance of independent variables are tested using standard t-tests.
 Parameter Estimates 
 Special Dividends Sample  Repurchase Tender Offers Sample 
Independent 
Variables 
ML 
(Selection) 
 
OLS 
% ∆ in 
Coeff. 
 ML 
(Selection) 
 
OLS 
% ∆ in 
Coeff. 
CONSTANT 0.13529 0.15800* 14.38%  -0.22246** 0.11500 293.44% 
DEPS 0.06383*** 0.06068*** -5.19%  -0.00160 -0.00283 43.61% 
RVOL 1.38201* 1.19400* -15.75%  0.60784 -0.18300 432.15% 
TOBINQ 0.00007 0.00188 96.08%  -0.01756 -0.00483 -263.65% 
FCF 0.01628 0.01663 2.12%  0.00199 0.00782 74.53% 
TKOVER -0.02390 -0.02679 10.77%  0.05539*** 0.02497 -121.82% 
LTDEQ
1
 0.00000 0.00000 -114.59%  0.00000 0.00001 79.87% 
SIZE -0.00676 -0.00838* 19.37%  0.00858 -0.00455 288.45% 
MNSTK -0.01021 -0.02224 54.10%  0.06950** 0.00337 -1963.48% 
DIVYLD 0.00083 0.00099* 16.28%  -0.00560** -0.00178 -215.39% 
EARVOL 0.07367 0.05706 -29.10%  0.05986 0.01333 -349.03% 
AVGRET -4.09968 -3.32800 -23.19%  -5.03856 0.49600 1115.84% 
RELPERM -0.00310 -0.00281 -10.15%  -0.00494 0.01022 148.31% 
CFPERM -0.10693 -0.10900 1.90%  0.09088 0.00688 -1221.71% 
DBETA -0.01762** -0.01818** 3.08%  0.00496 -0.00345 243.85% 
Wi -0.0192    0.1015*   
F-statistic  4.240*  4.110*    1.500**  0.830  
Adjusted R2  0.135  0.122    0.033  0.011  
Sample Size 313  222 
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively 
1 Note: Although the coefficients are rounded to zero the percentage differences reflect the change in the 
actual and not rounded coefficients (hence, non-zero percentage differences). 
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 I find that the selectivity variable is statistically significant for the repurchasing 
firms but not for the firms using special dividends. The selectivity variable on the 
repurchase equation is positive, however, and not negative as expected. This indicates 
that while sample selection exists, it implies that the firms are actually making decisions 
to the detriment of their stockholders. That is, the shareholders would in fact have been 
better off if the firms had issued special dividends instead of repurchasing their stock. 
This observation requires further research, particularly in light of the recent corporate 
scandals of the late 1990s and early 200s involving such firms as Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom, among others. 
 Only DEPS, RVOL and DBETA (all related to information signaling theory) are 
found to have a statistically significant relationship with the abnormal returns on 
announcement of special dividends. However, the sign on the coefficient of DBETA is 
opposite to what was expected. For the firms utilizing repurchase tender offers 
TKOVER, MNSTK and DIVYLD are the only variables having statistically significant 
coefficients. However, for both sub-samples the F-statistics are statistically significant 
indicating that the overall models for explaining the abnormal returns are useful. Other 
factors that have not been accounted for are the major drivers in explaining the market’s 
reaction to special dividends and tender offer repurchase announcements. 
 One possible alternative explanation is provided by Bagwell (1992) with respect 
to the stock market price reaction to repurchase tender offers. He documents that firms 
face upward-sloping supply curves when they repurchase shares in a Dutch auction. His 
analysis concludes that to repurchase its shares, a firm must offer a premium above its 
pre-announcement market price. Hence, the observed price increase on announcement 
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may merely be a movement along an upward-sloping supply curve. However, in this 
study I am primarily concerned with the relationship between the firm’s cash disbursement 
choice (dividend versus stock repurchase) and the impact of that choice on share prices. 
Hence, while this alternative rationale for the observed stock price reaction to a stock 
repurchase is valid, the tests utilized in addressing my primary hypothesis are not designed 
specifically  to differentiate between the effects of these various theories. Bagwell’s (1992) 
results, therefore, in no way invalidate the general findings of the present study. 
 
4.2.3  Comparison of Actual and Predicted Abnormal Returns 
 
 The primary hypothesis being examined was whether managers are making their 
disbursement decisions in the best interests of the firm’s stockholders. Additional insight into 
this question is provided by examining the difference between the mean abnormal returns for 
firms that made a particular disbursement choice and the mean predicted abnormal return for 
those firms had they chosen the alternate method. The result of this analysis is provided in 
Table 12 and further support our earlier conclusions.  
 Panel A indicates that for dividend increasing firms, the actual abnormal returns on 
announcement of their payout choice was statistically significantly lower than if they had 
made the alternate disbursement. For open market stock repurchasing firms, the actual 
abnormal returns on announcement of their payout choice was statistically significantly 
higher than if they had utilized dividends.  
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 This indicates that for these firms, the choice consistently maximized returns to their 
shareholders. I am, however, not able to conclusively support the hypothesis of stockholder 
wealth maximizing behavior for firms that choose to increase their dividends. 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Actual Excess Returns Upon Disbursement Announcement and 
Predicted Excess Returns for Alternate Payout Method 
Results comparing the actual CAR upon announcement of a dividend or repurchase and the predicted CAR if the firm in 
question had used the alternative payout method (that is, if the firm that paid dividends had instead repurchased its stock). 
Significance of results are tested using standard t-tests (t-statistics are in brackets). 
 Sample 
Size Actual CAR 
Predicted CAR for 
alternative payout choice 
Difference between actual 
and predicted CAR 
Panel A: Dividend Increases and Open Market Repurchases 
All Firms 4354 0.01380* 0.05132* -0.037512* 
  (14.70) (81.75) (-32.90)* 
Dividend Increases 2423 0.00835* 0.08336* -0.07501* 
  (9.52) (206.29) (-81.71) 
Open Mkt. Repurchases 1931 0.02065* 0.01110* 0.00954* 
  (11.49) (22.62) (5.32) 
Panel B: Special Dividends and Repurchase Tender Offers 
All Firms 535 0.03071* -0.03486* 0.06558* 
  (8.82) (-5.81) (9.104) 
Special Dividends 313 0.03306* -0.09836* 0.13143* 
  (6.91) (-17.55) (16.74) 
Rep. Tender Offers 222 0.0274* 0.05466* -0.02726** 
  (5.49) (5.93) (-2.56) 
* (**) - Statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively 
 
 Panel B of Table 12 report on the difference between the mean abnormal returns for 
firms that utilized special dividends and repurchase tender offers and the mean predicted 
abnormal return for those firms had they chosen the alternate payout method. Firms utilizing 
special dividends are found to be maximizing stockholder wealth (as measured by the 
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resulting announcement period abnormal returns) in their disbursement choice. In contrast, 
firms repurchasing their stock could have been better off if they had instead paid a special 
dividend (the difference between the actual and predicted abnormal returns is statistically 
significant and negative). This result is somewhat puzzling given that tender offer 
repurchases have traditionally elicited a higher stock market reaction than special dividends. 
Closer examination, however, reveals that our results may be sample specific, as the average 
abnormal returns for our sample of dividend payers (3.29 percent) is higher than that for the 
repurchasing firms (2.71 percent).  
 An alternative explanation of this anomaly is provided by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & 
Skinner (2000) who document that while in recent years there has been a dramatic overall 
decline in special dividend payments, the incidence of very large special dividends has 
increased and has not been displaced by stock repurchases. Concurrently, as reported by 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), the incidence and value of tender offer 
repurchases has shown a marked decline in the 1990s. Whereas tender offer repurchases 
were primarily used as takeover defenses and for leveraged recapitalizations, in more recent 
times there have been more privately negotiated transactions. The mean abnormal return for 
the special dividend sub-sample is larger in the post 1990 period compared with the pre 1990 
period (the difference is not statistically significant) while the mean abnormal return is 
smaller in the post 1990 period (statistically significant difference) for the tender offer 
repurchase sub-sample. There has thus been a shift in corporate payout policy during the 
sample period which tends to shed some doubt on the actual substitutability of special 
dividends and tender offer stock repurchases. 
 
 80 
4.2.4  Structural Form Probit Equations 
 
 Further insight into the primary research question is provided from an examination of 
the structural form probit models presented in Table 13. The structural form probit equations 
include an explanatory variable measuring the expected gain from utilizing dividends 
relative to repurchasing stock (BENEFIT), allowing for consistent estimation of the model. 
The model is also statistically identified since the abnormal return equation included at least 
one predetermined variable (DBETA) that is not included in the structural form. 
 The results for the dividend increasing and open market stock repurchasing sample 
reinforce our preliminary conclusions on managerial motivation in disbursement choice. The 
coefficient on BENEFIT is positive as expected but not statistically significant. The fact that 
we found selectivity bias in only the repurchase sub-sample could explain this lack of 
significance. Further research decomposing the sub-samples and analyzing them 
independently may shed light on this puzzling issue. Additionally, the coefficients on all the 
variables, with the exception of DEPS and CFPERM, have the hypothesized signs. 
Similarly, all the predetermined variables that were statistically significant in the reduced 
form probit remain statistically significant. This indicates that wealth maximization is not the 
only factor affecting the choice of disbursement. Instead, issues of asymmetric information, 
signaling, undervaluation, agency, financing cost, managerial incentives, clientele, financial 
flexibility, and cash flow permanence also have an impact on the decision, supporting the 
conclusions of earlier research in this area. 
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Table 13. Structural Form Probit Models Predicting the Choice of Disbursement 
Results for the probit maximum likelihood decision models (with dependent variable I=1 for dividends and 0 for 
repurchases). DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the 
residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung 
and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if 
the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of 
Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior 
to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares 
outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the 
standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is 
the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of 
permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash 
flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the announcement; and BENEFIT is the difference 
between the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase. 
Variable Dividend Increases versus Open Market Repurchases 
 Special Dividends versus 
Repurchase Tender Offers 
CONSTANT 2.45617*  2.77110*** 
DEPS 0.03796  -0.67622*** 
RVOL -34.52300*  -14.59780** 
TOBINQ 0.18279*  0.21259*** 
FCF 0.38702*  0.07948 
TKOVER -0.14241  -0.25662 
LTDEQ 0.00027  0.00022 
SIZE -0.08102*  -0.14060** 
MNSTK -0.39769*  -0.94729** 
DIVYLD 0.04094*  0.02930 
EARVOL -6.82179*  -0.85271 
AVGRET 325.82200*  35.34110 
RELPERM 0.24561*  0.06100 
CFPERM -0.83811**  -0.02464 
BENEFIT 6.18198  2.88970 
Chi-Squared 773.33*  101.39* 
Pseudo R2 0.4937  0.6296 
% Correctly Classified 67.73  69.16 
Sample Size 4354  535 
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively. 
 
 The results for the special dividend and tender offer repurchase sample also 
strengthen our preliminary inferences. The BENEFIT variable has a positive coefficient as 
expected, but it is also not statistically significant. Otherwise, the qualitative results are 
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similar to that found for the sample of dividend increases and open market repurchases. The 
indication, therefore, is that while the maximization of stockholder wealth may result from 
the firm’s disbursement choice, that choice is primarily driven by concerns as to signaling, 
asymmetric information, undervaluation, corporate control, financing cost, managerial 
incentives, and the firm’s stockholder clientele. 
 
4.3 Model Specification/Robustness Test 
 
 The adjustments for sample selection bias that I have utilized in this study have been 
found to be very sensitive to the assumption of normality (see Maddala (1991)). As a 
consequence, and in the absence of utilizing more generalized distributions or semi-
parametric methods, I run two alternate specifications of the model as a test of the robustness 
of the results presented earlier. These are estimated for the sample of dividend increasing and 
open-market repurchasing firms. The alternative models are formulated by alternating the 
variables introduced to proxy for signaling, financial flexibility, and cash flow permanence, 
respectively. That is, along with the other variables used, one model includes only DEPS, 
EARVOL, and RELPERM, while the other includes RVOL, AVGRET, and CFPERM, 
respectively. I present the results for these two alternative specifications of the model in 
Table 14 and Table 15. 
 For both alternative model specifications the general results remain qualitatively 
similar to that presented in our full model. In both cases the coefficients on the variables in 
the reduced probit models have similar signs and statistical significance as was observed 
earlier. The only exception to this is the SIZE variable in Model 1 which has the opposite 
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sign to that found in our original model. The same is true of the abnormal returns regression 
equations. In the case of the dividend increasing firms, for both alternative model 
specifications, MNSTK is the only variable with a sign different to that reported earlier. 
 
Table 14. Robustness Test with Alternate Model Specification - Model 1 
Results for the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the structural equations with alternate 
specifications. DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; TOBINQ is 
Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); 
TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 
otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market 
value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction 
of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the 
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the 
announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the 
announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; BENEFIT is the difference between 
the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase; and Wi is the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills 
Ratio). 
 
Variable Reduced Probit 
Dividend 
Regression 
Repurchase 
Regression 
Structural 
Probit 
CONSTANT -0.88635* 0.00819 0.09539* -0.15740 
DEPS 0.29225 0.03964* -0.00177 -0.07653 
TOBINQ 0.13139* 0.00403* -0.00572* 0.11026* 
FCF 0.32403* 0.01127*** -0.01391* 0.37569* 
TKOVER -0.17557 -0.01029 -0.00950 -0.06390 
LTDEQ 0.00015 0.00000*** 0.00001 0.00031 
SIZE 0.04021* -0.00195* -0.00787* 0.00041 
MNSTK -0.25719* -0.00877*** 0.00436 -0.20676* 
DIVYLD 0.05213* 0.00294* -0.00276* 0.02275** 
EARVOL -6.38829* -0.20246* 0.37396* -4.31607* 
RELPERM 0.24963* 0.01033** 0.00656* 0.11528** 
DBETA 0.10716* 0.01103* -0.01076* -- 
BENEFIT -- -- -- 5.06056* 
Wi -- 0.03739*  -0.08062* -- 
1Chi-Squared / F 374.34* 11.96* 10.66* 374.34* 
2Pseudo R2/Adjusted R2 0.4392 0.0515 0.0567 0.4392 
% Correctly Classified 64.56 -- -- 64.56 
Sample Size 4354 2423 1931 4354 
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively. 
1 Chi-Squared is calculated for the probit equations and the F-statistic for the regression equations. 
2 Pseudo R2 is presented for the probit equations and the Adjusted R2 for the regression equations. 
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Table 15. Robustness Test with Alternate Model Specification - Model 2 
Results for the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the structural equations with alternate 
specifications. RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is 
Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); 
TKOVER is a dummy variable representing the firm’s facing hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the 
announcement; LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the 
market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a 
fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the 
announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; CFPERM is the 
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the 
announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; BENEFIT is the difference between 
the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase; and Wi is the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills 
Ratio). 
 
Variable Reduced Probit 
Dividend 
Regression 
Repurchase 
Regression 
Structural 
Probit 
CONSTANT 1.88858* 0.04009* 0.11396* 2.13742* 
RVOL -45.16500* 0.62441 0.48334* -40.39370* 
TOBINQ 0.08489* 0.00088 0.00887* 0.14503* 
FCF 0.29336* 0.00418 0.00553 0.33707* 
TKOVER -0.10057 -0.00927 -0.02086 -0.18054 
LTDEQ 0.00017 0.00000 0.00001 0.00024 
SIZE -0.05536* -0.00235* -0.00307** -0.05775* 
MNSTK -0.29865* -0.00005 -0.02313* -0.43176* 
DIVYLD 0.03180* 0.00183* 0.00286* 0.03864* 
AVGRET 268.13500* -1.29396 5.90997* 323.22300* 
CFPERM -0.85002* 0.04052* 0.07414* -0.69677*** 
DBETA 0.04863 0.00918* -0.00096 -- 
BENEFIT -- -- -- 5.92056 
Wi -- -0.00070  -0.07397* -- 
1Chi-Squared / F 697.63* 10.88* 21.47* 697.63* 
2Pseudo R2/Adjusted R2 0.4773 0.0467 0.1129 0.4773 
% Correctly Classified 67.48 -- -- 67.48 
Sample Size 4354 2423 1931 4354 
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively. 
1 Chi-Squared is calculated for the probit equations and the F-statistic for the regression equations. 
2 Pseudo R2 is presented for the probit equations and the Adjusted R2 for the regression equations. 
 
 However, in the case of Model 1, the selectivity variable is now statistically 
significant (and positive as expected). For the sub-sample of repurchasing firms, Model 1 
exhibits the greatest departure from the results reported earlier. The coefficients on FCF, 
MNSTK, and EARVOL have opposite signs to those reported in our full model and all are 
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statistically significant. However, the selectivity variable remains statistically significant and 
has the correct negative sign in both Model 1 and Model 2. As this is the major focus of the 
model the other departures are not cause for major concern. 
 Turning our attention to the structural probit equations, the general results, 
qualitatively, are identical to that found in our original model. All the variables that were 
statistically significant continue to exhibit such characteristic and only DEPS and SIZE in 
Model 1 have coefficients of a different sign than was reported earlier. However, while the 
BENEFIT variable continues to have a positive sign in both alternative model specifications, 
it is now statistically significant in Model 1. I would, thus, conclude that the earlier results do 
not appear to be driven by the model specification, but are, in fact, quite robust to alternative 
specifications of the structural equations. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
 In this chapter, I have presented the results of all the statistical analyses undertaken, 
together with an interpretation of these results in the context of the present research 
hypotheses. I conducted the study primarily to examine the specific hypothesis mentioned 
earlier in section 3.1. 
 Some evidence was provided to reject the null hypotheses that managers do not 
discriminate in their choice of a payout method (albeit, primarily for the sample of firms that 
repurchase their stock). Specifically, the selectivity models provide support for and 
strengthen the argument that self-selection bias is a critical factor in studying the motivations 
for firms’ disbursement choices. Dividend paying and stock repurchasing firms display 
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significant differences in firm characteristics. Further, firms do not appear to randomly 
choose between the various disbursement choices. In the case of firms utilizing open-market 
stock repurchases, the observed choice of disbursement method is the result of a deliberate 
and specific decision made by the firm in the interest of maximizing the wealth position of 
its stockholders (based on the specific characteristics of the firm). The stock market then 
reflects these choices when it assesses the firm’s value on announcement of the distribution. 
 87 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Research Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The primary goal of this research was to empirically examine the disbursement 
choices made by managers. The main research question is whether firms choose specific 
cash distribution methods, based on explicit firm characteristics, so as to maximize their 
stockholders wealth position. The research is motivated by a need to resolve competing 
theoretical motivations for the various forms of cash distributions, particularly given the 
differing observed stock market wealth effect resulting from the disbursement 
announcements. Previous studies, for the most part, do not allow unbiased comparisons of 
the alternative disbursement mechanisms, as they examine each distribution method 
independently without considering their potential interactions. My analyses avoids this 
potential sample selection bias by integrating and examining simultaneously (i) firms that 
increase their regular cash dividends and firms that initiate open market stock repurchase 
programs, and (ii) firms that announce specially designated dividends and those that 
undertake repurchase tender offers. 
 Many of the propositions and conclusions drawn from previous studies in this area 
are supported by my results. In accord with Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Persons (1995), I 
find that the level of asymmetric information (extent of undervaluation) has an impact on the 
payout choice. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach’s (2000) and Guay and Harford’s 
(2000) hypotheses that the financial flexibility inherent in stock repurchases contributes to 
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the choice of payout method used by firms and that the permanence of the firm’s cash flows 
are important in this choice are also supported (primarily as regards the choice between a 
dividend increase and an open market stock repurchase). Fenn and Liang (2000) concluded 
that the extent to which management stock options are available influences the choice and 
suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the 
expense of dividends. My results also support this view.  
 While the above research conclusions were drawn from independent examination of 
the differing motivations, my results stem from jointly analyzing the various motivations and 
simultaneously allowing for the impact of a stockholder wealth maximization incentive on 
the decision. Consequently, the self-selectivity models provide results suggesting that firms 
do not randomly assign themselves to disbursement methods. Instead, the choice of a 
disbursement method is optimally made, with respect to firms choosing to utilize open 
market stock repurchases, and is reflected in the reaction of the stock market to the firm’s 
distribution announcement. I find that even in the presence of asymmetric information, 
agency costs, and differing expected stock price reactions to the various mechanisms of cash 
disbursements, these firms, on average, choose the cash distribution method that maximizes 
the expected gain associated with the distribution. Hence, managers utilizing open market 
stock repurchases, on average, make stockholder wealth maximizing disbursement choices, 
notwithstanding the influence of other factors on the payout decision. Similar results were 
inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends, while those firms using 
repurchase tender offers were found to be making decisions detrimental to the welfare of 
their stockholders. 
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The acute self-selection problem identified suggests that previous researchers have 
overstated the expected market responses to disbursement announcements made by a firm 
chosen at random. The approach used in this study thus provides a more complete 
understanding of the ex-ante information content of stock repurchases and dividend 
distributions, while also revealing significant discriminatory factors that influence the firm’s 
choice of a specific disbursement method. 
 Although this study has provided additional insights on the rationales for the various 
disbursement methods, and thereby contributed to the existing literature in this area of 
research, much still remains to be done to completely understand and model managerial 
decision making and incentives. 
 Future extensions of this research lie in utilizing the limited dependent /qualitative 
variables methodology (modeled in this study by an endogenous switching regression) in 
extending standard event-study methodology used in previous research on disbursement 
mechanisms. The importance in recognizing the existence of self-selection is that it leads to 
non-random samples and hence biased inferences when standard event-study methodology is 
applied. The limited dependent/qualitative variables model provides a direct test for self-
selectivity bias and thus produces a more complete description of the ex-ante information 
content and returns distribution process for cash disbursements. Additionally, the model can 
be extended to the analysis of any corporate event where potential self-selectivity exists. 
 Another interesting extension lies in investigating the disbursement decisions of 
managers across different markets. This would be an attempt to assess whether the results 
and conclusions arrived at in the present research applies across the various markets. This 
could also provide additional insights into the differences and similarities between the major 
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stock markets. Given the results of this study, which implies some differentiation in the 
motivation for open market stock repurchases and repurchase tender offers, it would also be 
interesting to more closely analyze the choice between these two forms of stock repurchases. 
 In summary, I have attempted to provide in this chapter a general overview of the 
motivation for, research questions examined, and interpretation of results obtained from this 
research. I have also sought to highlight the important contributions of this study and suggest 
future opportunities for research extending the present work. 
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Endnotes 
 
  
1. Except for the tax-clientele theories, early research into this question treated stock 
repurchases and dividends as equivalent mechanisms for cash payout to 
stockholders. 
2.  Empirical findings indicate that firms are unlikely to increase dividends unless they 
perceive that the increased dividend can be maintained. See for example Miller and 
Rock (1985), Ofer and Siegel (1987), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994). 
3. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) indicate to the contrary that firms have 
typically paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regular dividends, with 
the exception of very large specials (equal or exceed 5% of equity value). 
4.  The model utilized in this study assumes that the choice is mutually exclusive. 
Thus, firm either pay dividends or repurchase their stock, but not both.  For this 
reason, any firm that simultaneously paid dividends and repurchased its stock was 
excluded from my sample. 
5. The reaction to open-market repurchases is significantly lower than that to tender-
offers -- 4 percent compared to between 7 percent to 15 percent [see Masulis 
(1980a), Vermaelen (1981), and Stephenson (1994)]. This observation also 
applies to dividends, with the reaction to special dividends averaging 1 percent, 
dividend increases 1 percent to 2 percent, and dividend initiations 3 percent to 4 
percent [see Brickley (1983), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), and Reynolds 
(1994)]. 
6. Ofer and Thakor (1987), Barclay and Smith (1988), and Hausch and Seward 
(1993), provide only partial explanations for this phenomenon. 
7. Extracted from Table I, Barclay and Smith (1988, p.62). The remaining 5 percent 
of firms is divided approximately equally between the firms that utilized special 
dividends and those that neither paid dividends nor repurchased stock over the period 
covered by their study. 
8.  Modern finance theory has shown that in perfect markets capital structure does 
not affect firm value. Value is determined solely by the earning potential of the 
firm’s assets. 
9. In performing this test their sample was limited to 2,068 of the original 6,777 
dividend change announcements – including 1,865 dividend increases and 203 
dividend decreases. 
10.  Further empirical support for the clientele hypothesis is provided by Denis, Denis, 
and Sarin (1994), as discussed earlier in section 2.1.1.1. 
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11. See Vermaelen (1984), Ofer and Thakor (1987), and Comment and Jarrell (1991). 
12. Ofer and Thakor, ibid., pg. 386. 
13. See Maddala (1983), pg. 223 et seq. for a more detailed treatment of the model. 
14.  This is a necessary correction for the conditional expectation given that we have 
non-random selection, that is, certain units from the underlying population do not 
appear in a random sample due to their individual disbursement choice. 
15. CRSP provides a single composite index incorporating all firms on NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
16.  Notwithstanding, results of all the above statistical tests are reported after re-
estimating the market model (more specifically the systematic risk component, β) 
using the methodology proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977). As reported in 
Fowler and Rorke (1983), the re-estimated beta is given by the following, shown to 
be a consistent estimator: 
 
( )
( )p i i i ilim $β
β β β
ρ=
+ +
+
− +1 0 1
11 2
 
where: 
 i
−1β  = the parameter estimate obtained from the simple regression of Rit against Rmt-1 
 i
0β  = the parameter estimate obtained from the synchronous simple regression 
 i
+1β  = the parameter estimate obtained from the simple regression of Rit against Rmt+1 
 1ρ  = the first order serial correlation coefficient for the market index, Rm 
17.  Eliminating small dividend changes would also minimize problems arising from 
misspecification in the model of expected dividends since large dividend changes 
are likely to be categorized as dividend surprises regardless of the expectation 
model employed. 
18.  See Damodaran (2001) Figure 21.6, page 663. 
19.  There were 59 firms that announced both a dividend increase and an open market 
repurchase program while one firm announced a tender offer and a special 
dividend simultaneously. 
20.  Financial firms are consistently omitted from similar studies primarily because 
their repurchases are not consistently reported (Fenn and Liang, 2001), (Fama and 
French, 2001). Heavily regulated firms (utilities and telephone companies) are 
omitted because their payout policies may be significantly affected by their 
regulated status (Fenn and Liang, 2001). 
21. See Ofer and Thakor (1987) for a theoretical justification of this observation. 
22.  Data on hostile takeover target announcements are taken from the Securities Data 
Company database. 
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23.  The solution to the selection bias problem, as outlined in Maddala (1991), 
requires that there be at least one exogenous variable affecting selection that does 
not appear in the structural equation. DBETA was excluded from the structural 
equation as there was no extant theoretical research justifying its inclusion. 
24. Even in the presence of multicollinearity the regression estimates will still be 
unbiased and consistent.  The effect of multicollinearity is that the coefficient 
estimates will tend to have large standard errors, causing us to increasingly accept 
the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient and thereby increasing the probability of 
a Type II error. 
25.  See endnote 4 from Chapter 1. 
26.  The results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent regardless of the methodology used and 
appear quite robust. Adjusting beta for non-synchronous trading using the Scholes 
and Williams (1977) methodology has no noticeable impact on the qualitative 
results. As a consequence, all the remaining statistical analyses utilized the standard 
market model cumulative abnormal returns and ignored the Scholes-Williams beta 
adjustment, since the results would be qualitatively identical. The estimated 
abnormal returns calculated with and without the non-synchronous trading 
adjustment are almost perfectly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.995 
for the sample of dividend increases and open market repurchases and 0.998 for the 
sample of special dividends and repurchase tender offers) 
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